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Abstract 
Perception is the recognition of elements and events in the environment, usually through 
integration of sensory impressions. It is considered here as a broad, high-level, object centered, 
phenomenon which happens at and above the level of holistic recognition of objects and events, 
where semantics begin to play a role. We propose and develop a mathematical theory of artificial 
perceptions. A basic mathematical category is defined. Its objects are perceptions, consisting of world 
elements, connotations, and a three-valued true, false, undefined predicative correspondence between 
them. Morphisms describe paths between perceptions. This structure serves as premises for a 
mathematical theory. The theory provides rigorous tools of scrutiny that deal with fundamental issues 
of AI such as the diversity and embodiment of artificial perceptions. It extends and systematizes 
certain intuitive pre-theoretical conceptions about perception, about improving and/or completing an 
agent’s perceptual grasp, about transition between various perceptions, etc. Mathematical tools and 
methods are used to formalize reasonable ways to go about producing a meaningful cognitive image 
of the environment from every perception. 0 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. 
Keywords: Mathematical foundations of AI; Artificial perception and cognition; Categorical formalizations in AI 
1. Introduction 
The science of Artificial Intelligence conceives and constructs autonomous intelligent 
artificial agents to bring about “intelligent” effects. Those effects are typically related 
to the environment of the artificial agent. Intelligence is marked by quick active 
i‘ There is no intention to deal with human perceptual orcognitive processes. Any anthropomorphisms or human 
analogs used in this study are for intuitive purposes only, to make the presentation more vivid and readable. 
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perception and understanding. The essential core of autonomous cognitive behavior is 
thus the integration of sensing, perceiving and representing. High-level perception is the 
recognition of elements and events in the environment, usually through integration of 
sensory impressions. It is considered here as a broad, high-level, phenomenon, which 
resides higher than pixels on the screen or waveforms of sound. It is object centered 
and therefore it happens at and above the level of holistic recognition of objects, where 
semantics begin to play a role. The raw materials of high-level perception are connotations 
of wholesome recognized environmental entities. At that point perception needs to produce 
a logical, coherent and meaningful representation of the environment and to use it for 
various cognitive tasks. 
In [48] Newell states that perception is an area which should definitely be covered 
by theories of cognition, since cognitive behavior is a function of the environment. 
In [50], Nilsson proposes to work towards what he calls Hubile Systems: programs 
of general, humanlike, competence. The abilities of such systems should “. . include 
whatever is needed for an agent to get information about the environment in which 
it operates . . perceptual processing . . . facilities for receiving, understanding, and 
generating communications.. . ability to learn . . “. This direction was already suggested 
in [49] where Nilsson proposed to develop life long Cumputer Individuals who should 
have a continuing existence. They would have, among other things, a (constantly 
changing) model of the world, they would benefit from their experiences, and they would 
communicate with other agents, artificial or human. These agents could do anything 
that requires moving around in and sensing a real environment and manipulating that 
environment in some way. By having a continuing existence and learning from their own 
experience they would, in time, develop their own individual image of their environment, 
which draws upon their own sensory-motor-neural capabilities and their own experience. 
In planning such an agent, one cannot separate the sensory-motor-neural apparatus from 
cognition, from higher-level reasoning, and from the communication capabilities: all these 
functions should cooperate. The proposed mathematical theory of artificial perceptions 
and the tools it offers may constitute a step towards achieving the challenge of general 
basic artificial intelligence. The mathematical treatment provides a single context for the 
treatment of various perceptual and cognitive processes, including, among other things, 
transition and comparison between different perceptions, improving and completing a 
perceptual grasp, joint perceptions, and a bridge that integrates perception and higher 
reasoning (i.e., problem solving, decision making etc.). This warrants a unified theory, 
where the separate processes enhance one another rather then interfere with one another. 
Artificial agents may collect information about their environment using their sensory- 
motor-neural apparatus. This information is then reflected inside the artificial agent in some 
way. The collecting of the information, together with its internal reflection, is conceived 
by this work as arti$cial perception. The raw internal reflection could then be arranged in 
any way to represent he agent’s own cognitive image of its environment, the arrangement 
serving as the basis for further, higher level reasoning processes. 
A mathematical structure is proposed which formalizes artificial perception. This 
proposed formalization provides standard mathematical tools of scrutiny, SO that one can 
meticulously perform and analyze in the domain of artificial perceptions. The proposed 
system is general enough to formalize a wide spectrum of artificial perceptions. Any such 
Z. Arzi-Gonczarowski, D. Lehmann /ArtiJcial Intelligence 102 (199X) 187-247 189 
perception usually has its own sensory-motor-neural mechanisms and its own method of 
internally reflecting the output which emerges from this apparatus into the agent’s internal 
modules. The generality is achieved via a categorization which is able to accommodate any 
correspondence between an external environment and an internal reflection of it. 
Many things seem to happen from the moment a phenomenon in the environment comes 
to being, through its perception by the agent, and until it is processed and eventually 
leaves its mark on the agent’s cognition. The things which happen at the early stages of 
this chain of events are typically predetermined by innate mechanisms and equipment. 
These are formalized by the perception predicate. The agent is constructed to perceive 
world elements (w-elements for short) and to reflect them with connotations (the exact 
nature of these concepts will be explained soon). The connotations of every w-element are 
determined primarily by the built-in sensory-motor-neural apparatus. As an example from 
humans, the way we perceive colors, tastes, sounds, smells, textures and other outside 
phenomena is determined primarily by our neurophysiology, plus our experience and 
socio-cultural influences. For artificial agents, programming may stand for the latter ones 
in their broadest sense. 
The later stages of the perceptual chain of processing feature, on the other hand, more 
apparent flexibility: the artificial agent now has the connotations of its w-elements, and is 
free to manipulate things internally. There would usually be room for a contingent course 
of action. That is where programmable, perceptual-cognitive processes come in. These 
are the processes with which this study is concerned. One asks questions such as: in this 
given perceptual situation, can one detect lawlike orders and patterns of connotations? Are 
there redundant connotations? What is the best way to arrange them for the benefit of 
future reasoning processes? Tools are proposed with which the agent may give its own, 
informed, solutions to these problems. It can systematically obtain a representation of the 
given situation. It creates its own cognitive image of its environment. The entire process is 
based only on information provided by the lower, embodied level. 
There are debates as to how much of the intelligent, cognitive, processing lies below 
and/or above the symbolic, conscious level (see, for example, [34]). Our proposed 
formalization of perception is flexible enough to accommodate any location of the 
separation between lower- and higher-level processes. It presents an abstract concept 
of perception, and thus permits the introduction of either simple or more integrated 
connotations at the basic perception level. 
All the definitions, constructions and results are operated within a mathematical system. 
This ensures a tidy treatment and thus communicates and introduces to the related domains 
tools of mathematical rigor and results that are meticulously stated. These tools could 
hopefully be used and further applied for research in these related domains. 
2. Pre-theoretical and methodological considerations 
This work presents and applies a mathematical system for the formalization of artificial 
perception and related cognitive processes. Mathematical systems are based on semantic 
primitives that are context independent. However, there is more than often an intuitive 
grounding for mathematical semantic primitives. This applies to this work where the formal 
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system is grounded intuitively in a perceptual, cognitive environment. We first discuss these 
intuitions and their background. 
2. I. Diversity of perceptions 
We are dealing with an artificial agent that perceives its environment. Assume that it is 
placed next to a box, and that it has the sensory-motor-neural capabilities to determine the 
contents of the box. Someone asks the agent whether the box is full. Some of the following 
problems may arise: 
- The agent may or may not have been programmed, according to its purposes, to 
consider a box full of air as full. 
- It may or may not have been programmed to consider a half full box as full. 
- What if the box is full of waste-paper, which could be disposed of. Is such a box 
considered full? 
- The agent might have no “idea of fullness”. It may or may not have other notions such 
as “filled” or “empty”, but does not recognize “full”. 
- Finally, the agent may not perceive “a box”, but rather six elements which form the 
sides of the box. 
Indeed, perception and cognition do depend on the sensory-motor-neural apparatus of 
the agent, its history and experience, and on other capacities to perceive, to form mental 
images, and to organize them internally. Different individuals could break the same reality 
into different elements, and choose different uniformities as their properties. A partial 
list of AI-related works that touch on this issue is [7,30,35,38], to name just a few. 
Some extreme and intriguing examples of cases of human perceptions are given in 
[45]. AI has to deal with artificial agents that do not even share the same architecture. 
Their hardware is different, their sensory-motor-neural apparatus varies, and they are 
conceived and programmed for different purposes by different people who build their own 
conceptualizations into the system, each using his own encoding. 
2.2. Categorization of perceptions 
Given the diversity of artificial perceptions, the question is how one can account for such 
a diversity, yet at the same time formalize a theory of it. Our solution is in the categorization 
of perceptions. 
The philosophical idea of categorization was introduced in the 18th century by 
Immanuel Kant, in his statement “Grounding for the Metaphysics ofMoruls” [31]. It is 
central to cognitive science (see [38]). A simple example is the category of cups. Cups 
can come in many shapes and forms, but they all have something in common. The agent 
then creates out of this “cuphood” a mental image of a cup, an abstract cup that does not 
match any particular cup from the category. The agent also has general motor actions for 
dealing with real instances of cups. It is generally agreed that humans are endowed with 
natural talents for categorization, whereas the task seems hard for artificial perceptions. In 
that case we should be able to categorize artificial perceptions: we should recognize the 
essence of artificial perception, and we should create a formal image of it. This formal, 
abstract, perception should not match any particular perception, yet we shall have the tools 
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for dealing with all perceptions. In Kant’s words, this should be done . . . entirely a priori, 
since here we do not enjoy the advantage of having its reality given in experience . . . 
The abstract idea of a perception will be postulated as a mathematical construct which 
relates between phenomena outside the artificial agent, a set of world elements (w-elements 
for short), and reflections which are internal to the artificial agent, a set of connotations. 
World elements exist independently of any thought or perception. Anything which exists 
independent of the artificial agent, and could perhaps be discerned by it, is a legitimate 
w-element. Possible example w-elements are a face, a light blow of wind, the shadow of a 
smile, a slight shivering of voice, a tinge of smell or taste or color, etc. Not every sensory- 
motor-neural mechanism is able to discern every such outside phenomenon, and even if it 
does it may not attach the same connotations to them. Furthermore, different perceptions 
might break the same reality into different parts to serve as wholesome w-elements. 
Although the external environment has an objective existence, its division into w-elements 
is subjective. 
The term connotation was chosen (rather than “attribute” or “property”) to stress the 
affinity to the agent’s own individual, personal experience, and to subtle distinctions. 
It is a meaning which is more than just a primary meaning. As an example, on top 
of the conventional term of “mother” may or may not come connotations such as 
“love”, “comfort”, and “warmth”. Further more, connotations may be of a metonymic or 
metaphorical nature such as in “Necessity is the mother of invention”. Connotations could 
also be, for example, iconic. 
It is impossible to separate perception from the environment to which it relates. The 
idea of a cognitive supraindividual that includes its environment is elaborated in 1291. 
Every perception has its own set of w-elements, its own set of connotations, and its own 
predicative correspondence between the sets. They are given once the instance perception 
is fixed, in very much the same way that the details of the cup are accessible once a 
perception relates to a specific instance of a cup. The correspondence between w-elements 
and connotations is given as a two-place partial predicate. 
Mathematical category theory started with [ 171. It provides tools of scrutiny for stating 
results which can be used across a wide spectrum of mathematical domains and objects 
]l ,13,28,43]. No specific knowledge of category theory is assumed for reading this paper. 
The required categorical concepts will be introduced whenever their actual applicability 
emerges from the context, providing an ad hoc justification for the formalism. It so happens 
that the categorical toolkit often allows a precise description of complex phenomena that 
are too complex to be grasped by a verbal description. 
This work defines perceptions as a domain of mathematical discourse, where different 
perceptions represent different members of the category. Structural similarities among 
perceptions can be studied, yet leaving ample room for differences and variety. Indeed, 
the more general the setting, the less likely it is that the results will be profound. 
A combination of generality and depth is attained by gradually concentrating on more 
restricted subcategories of perceptions, thus identifying this part which is deep and proper 
to “better” perceptions and separating it from that part which is trivial. More specific results 
can be shown if discussion is restricted to a subset of “better” perceptions. Loosely, these 
perceptions can be qualified as those where the set of connotations is closed under Boolean 
operations. 
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2.3. Boolean algebra as a cognitive tool 
Boolean algebra was first introduced by George Boole in his 1854 statement [ 121 
An Znvestigation of the Laws of Thought. During the century that followed this first 
publication, the theory of Boolean algebras was developed both as a special kind of 
algebraic ring and as a generalization of the set-theoretical notion of a field of sets. Major 
contributions are due to Jevons, Peirce, Schroeder, Whitehead, Huntington, Tarski, and 
Stone (to name just a few). 
There are debates as to the suitability of Boolean operations to model human cognition, 
especially at the lower, sensory-motor-neural level. The idea that Boolean algebra could be 
applied to express acts of conscious thinking is due to George Boole himself [8, pp. 433- 
4471. This work is, however, not committed to imitating human perceptual cognitive 
behavior. The categorical transition from basic artificial perceptions to Boolean artificial 
perceptions is conceived by this study to formalize a bridge between a lower, artificial 
sensory-motor-neural level (that could be based, for example, on a neural network), 
and higher artificial reasoning levels. As mentioned in the Introduction section, the 
mathematical model is flexible enough to accommodate any location of a boundary 
between an innate sub-symbolic lower level, and higher-level cognitive processes. Either 
very basic or more integrated connotations can be introduced at the level where perceptions 
finally label sensory-motor-neural outputs with symbols, and semantics begin to play a 
role. 
The cognitive processes that are described in this work result in embodied cognitive 
structures that are cast as Boolean algebras. They are structures that are, among other 
things, interpretable as logical formulas. The dominant view in AI is that the knowledge 
content of high-level reasoning programs ought to be represented by data structures with 
this property [24]. 
2.4. Partiality of perception, three values of truth, nonmonotonicity 
One of the assumptions that will be expressed by the formalization is that perception is 
not total. Recall the perception of the closed box from the beginning of Section 2. Assume 
now that it does discern it as a single w-element: “box”, that it has the connotation “full”, 
and that the predicative correspondence of “full” to w-elements in the world is adapted to 
the reader’s choice. 
- The agent may be unable to perceive whether the w-element “box” is “full” due to 
sensory-motor-neural deficiencies. 
- In other cases the agent might have the required sensory-motor-neural capabilities, 
but it does not bother to use them because the question is irrelevant to its current 
purposes. 
- In yet another case the agent might have knowledge of the contents of the box, but for 
current purposes it is more practical not to distinguish full boxes from others. 
- There can also be a case where the box is only half full, and it is better to leave the 
question unanswered until, eventually, practical or other considerations will determine 
the box status as full or not. 
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In all these cases, and there may be others, it is desirable to leave perception undefined. For 
such reasons the p-predicate is partial: in some cases it gives no definite answer. Whether 
the “box” is “full” may be true (t),fuZse (f), or undejined (u). 
The proposed, non-classical, solution is to have a third truth value, undefined (u for 
short), and to define the predicate as total. The predicate then assumes the third truth value, 
u, whenever perception is undefined. This does not mean that we admit more than two 
genuine truth values. It rather captures the idea of a truth value gap, and provides us with a 
convenient designation for the undefined cases. 
In the mathematical background there are a few three-valued logics [26,27,57], each of 
them with its intuitive interpretation. Two of them are relevant to us. Kleene’s [36] intuitive 
interpretation is that the third truth value represents ignorance: there exists a truth value, 
only it is not exposed for some reason. This corresponds to the cases above where there 
is ignorance or irrelevance of the fullness of the box. It could also capture indifference or 
inattentiveness. Lukasiewicz’s [41,42] intuitive interpretation is that the third truth value 
represents indeterminacy or future contingence. This corresponds to the case of the half 
full box where there is no decision yet, with the assumption that it might eventually be 
decided. 
Intuitively, then, these are two different interpretations. Technically, though, the resulting 
logics are very similar. Both follow the principle that where one can determine the truth 
value, t or f, of a compound well-formed formula from its components, that wfs should 
be assigned that truth value, regardless of whether or not certain of its components are 
undecided. So, for example, A v B will be assigned the value t if one of A or B is assigned 
the value t, even if the value u is assigned to the other. The only formal difference between 
Lukasiewicz’s and Kleene’s connectives relates to the conditional and biconditional: under 
Lukasiewicz’s interpretation the conditional A -+ B is assigned t when A and B are 
indeterminate. Consequently, his system, unlike Kleene’s, preserves the law of identity: 
it is always t that A t, A. 
From the interpretational point of view, we want our third truth value to capture both the 
ignorance/irrelevance case and the future contingence case. For other reasons we wanted to 
preserve the law of identity. Hence Lukasiewicz’s three-valued logic is adopted here. Our 
interpretation is of a rather pragmatic nature: the undefined truth value might eventually 
become defined, t or f, but right now it is not. By the individuality of perceptions this 
is not a matter of a universal fact, so that the question whether or not it has already been 
decided in some transcendental way becomes meaningless and irrelevant to our purposes. 
Any instance of perception may give no answer on whether the “box” is “full”. This is 
done for reasons “private” to the agent, with no need to give any account whatsoever about 
them. This is very much in the same way that there is no need to explain why a box is 
either “full” or not. The issue of why perception is us it is simply warrants no discussion. 
Lukasiewicz’s three-valued logic has an aspect of nonmonotonicity. Let us reconsider 
perception of the box. Suppose that it confirms about a set of boxes the following facts: 
- Any box that is perceived full is also perceived red. 
- Any box that is perceived not red is also perceived not fill. 
(By “not full” and “not red” boxes it is meant that the p-predicate actually yields the 
truth value false in answer to the relevant question, and not that the answer is undefined.) 
Suppose, in addition, that there is one box (or more) for which both redness and fullness 
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are not defined by perception (the box is covered by a blanket), This is exactly a case where 
Lukasiewicz’s logic will differ from Kleene’s. In Kleene’s logic, such a box will prevent 
perception from concluding that a full box is always red. However, by Lukasiewicz’s logic 
which we have just adopted, perception will nonetheless come to that conclusion: afill 
box is always red. Indeed, some time in the future the blanket might be removed, so that 
perception will improve to the point where it definitely observes that this box is full but 
green. The conclusion will have to be retracted. 
Reasoning is called nonmonotonic when the reasoning agent must withdraw a previously 
deduced conclusion in response to learning some new fact. Nonmonotonicity is often 
encountered in AI, and many efforts and achievements were recorded in this area of 
research ([46,47,52,53] to name just a few). The intelligent agent “jumps to conclusions” 
in spite of incomplete information. The incompleteness of the information is represented, 
in our case, by the third truth value, u. The agent might eventually use these perceptual 
conclusions for practical purposes (such as the advice to dump all boxes that are not red). 
This constitutes a risk. It is not impossible to imagine a natural situation where humans 
jump to such conclusions and take such risks. A typical reason for doing this is that the 
agent needs to come to as many plausible conclusions as possible in order to achieve 
something. Without taking the risk it might stay with nothing much to do. Insisting on 
absolute security with no risks may often be paralyzing: i.e., it might be impractical either 
to keep all boxes or to check all of them. 
2.5. Summary of Section 2 
The formalization of artificial perceptions in a mathematical system will be based on the 
following pre-theoretical intuitions: 
- Perceptions differs from one artificial agent to another, There does not exist any 
perception which is “objectively” correct. All perceptions are legitimate. 
- The necessary component of perceptions is the correspondence between a set of 
outside w-elements and a set of internal reflections (connotations). These sets and 
the correspondence between them are determined independently for every instance of 
artificial perception. 
- In “better” perceptions the set of connotations is closed under Boolean connectives. 
_ Artificial perception is partial. It may not provide a definite answer to every question 
about its perception. The reasons for this may vary, but all the cases where perception 
is undefined are treated uniformly by Lukasiewicz’s three-valued logic. It is assumed 
that eventually the undefined cases of perception might turn out to be defined either 
as true or as false. 
- Due to the partiality of perceptions and its treatment by the three-valued logic, the 
agent may “jump to conclusions” that may eventually turn out to be incorrect. Such 
risks are taken for the sake of coming to as many plausible conclusions as possible in 
order to achieve something. 
In commitment to the mathematical formalization, results will be inferred and concluded 
only from the formal premises using mathematical tools and methods. However, whenever 
a result is reached, it will be possible to examine it with regard to these pre-theoretical 
Z. Arzi-Gonczarowski, D. Lehmann /Art$cial Intelligence 102 (1998) 187-247 195 
considerations, and to test it against existing theories and opinions about artificial 
perceptions and cognition. 
3. Background and related research 
This study does not directly carry forward an existing body of work. It tries to propose 
a new mathematical framework, where no such framework already exists, for a theory 
of artificial perceptions. It is, however, akin to several research paths. Methods and 
results from category theory, Boolean algebra and Lukasiewicz’s three-valued logic will 
be applied, as explained above. These are the mathematical beaten tracks that we tread. 
In AI this work falls in with other applications of mathematical methods for purposes 
of this domain [9,16]. The advantages of mathematical formalizations as analyzed, for 
example, in the introduction to [ 151 include clarity, precision, versatility, generalizability, 
testability, allowance to model complex phenomena that are far too complex to be grasped 
by a verbal description, and allowance to use results of a well-developed science. 
Within mathematics, category theory seems suitable for purposes of AI. AI tries, in a 
sense, to approximate intelligence by creating particular models of artificial intelligence as 
well as foundations for a general account of such intelligence. In that context the following 
quotation from Lawvere [39] seems relevant: “even within mathematical experience, only 
that [category] theory has approximated a particular model of the general, sufficient 
as a foundation for a general account of all particulars”. Lawvere further argues that 
category theory provides a guide to the complex, but very non-arbitrary constructions 
of the concepts and their interactions which grow out of the study of any serious object 
of study. There has not been, however, much AI related research utilizing mathematical 
category theory. A few examples are given in [lo]. They include employing categorical 
terminology and tools for problem solving strategies [4], for program reformulation 
[40], and for representation engineering [59]. Except for the very use of the categorical 
infrastructure, these applications are different from the category of perceptions presented 
here. A recent revival of interest in category theory for computer science is demonstrated 
by the publication of several books such as ]3,6,51,58]. Their emphasis is typically on 
categorical logic and semantics. 
Another long research path that this work touches is the study of cognition. Cognitive 
studies have other motivations and goals, because they are typically interested in human 
cognition and in being empirically adequate from a psychological point of view. However, 
their track often coincides with that of AI. Concepts and processes of human intelligence 
have inherently been a source of inspiration for research in AI and the present one is 
no exception. (However, this work is not committed to being empirically adequate from 
a psychological point of view.) One formalism for perception and cognition that shares 
some common aspects with the descriptive features of the formalization in this study is 
the “conceptual spaces” framework by Gardenfors [2 l-231. It is applied by the cognitive 
architecture that is described in [14]. Conceptual spaces do not go, however, into the 
formalization of the variety of complex cognitive constructions and processes that is 
enabled here by the usage of the categorical toolkit. Marrying mathematical category 
theory with cognitive studies is also proposed in [44]. As for the use of Boolean algebra in 
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the cognitive sciences, an example is [33] which formalizes semantics for natural language 
using Boolean algebra. 
The issue of alternative viewpoints is shared with research in the area of ontology 
design. Different ontologies represent different perceptions. [20] agrees that achieving 
interoperability and sharing of independently created ontologies is a challenging task. 
Dealing with alternative viewpoints is also shared with research in user modeling [32]: 
systems that try to model their individual users also need to deal with the particular 
perception of each user (or users’ class). Some of our examples (e.g., Example 9) will 
be related to that. 
As we proceed with the definitions, constructions, and results of this study, associations 
of specific aspects with other research will be mentioned in the context of their 
presentation. 
4. The formal concept of artificial perception 
We postulate the abstract idea of a perception as a mathematical construct which relates 
between phenomena outside the artificial agent, a set of world elements, and reflections 
which are internal to the artificial agent, a set of connotations. Every perception has its 
own set of w-elements, its own set of connotations, and its own predicative correspondence 
between the sets. 
Definition 1. A perception machine (perception for short) is a three-tuple (r, Z, e) where: 
- & and Z are finite, disjoint sets. 
- e is a three-valued predicate Q : I x Z + {t, f, u}. 
The set 8 represents the outside, objective, world which the machine perceives. Anything 
which exists independent of the artificial agent, and could perhaps be discerned by it, 
could be a legitimate element of E and hence an w-element. Example w-elements may 
be a sound, a light, a blow of wind, a vapor (smelly or not), a candy bar, etc. These 
example w-elements are typically discerned by the human sensory-motor-neural apparatus, 
but some artificial perceptions may be unable to discern them. They may, however, 
discern w-elements that are imperceptible for humans, such as certain kinds of radiation. 
Furthermore, different perceptions might break the same reality into different wholesome 
w-elements. An example was given in the introduction: wherever one perceives a single 
wholesome w-element “box”, another may perceive an arrangement of six w-elements 
“board’. For humans, a human face would usually be a single, wholesome w-element that 
is easily perceived. Whether this is also the case where machine perception is involved, 
is, however, not so clear. Hence, although we assume the external environment to have an 
objective existence, its division into w-elements depends on the specific perception. (This 
phenomenon, as related to humans, has been studied by gestalt psychology [ 181.) 
The set Z stands for the internal representation, the ontology, of w-elements. Its elements 
have a subjective existence dependent on the machine. Anything which may be stored and 
manipulated in the machine (words, symbols, icons, etc.) could be a legitimate element of 
Z and hence a connotation. Example connotations may stand for the pitch and/or duration 
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and/or timbre and/or volume of a sound, the brightness and/or hue and/or saturation of a 
light, etc. These example connotations typically represent attributes or properties that are 
measurable by humans, and hence considered “objective”. However, “hot” and/or “dark” 
and/or “good” and/or “?!?!?” are legitimate connotations as well (the last one is not a typo). 
These are definitely not “objective”, they depend on the specific perception. 
The three-valued predicate Q is the perception predicate (p-predicate for short) which 
relates w-elements and connotations, the connection between the environment and internal 
representations. The terminology for the various Q values will be the following: 
- Q(W. o) = t, it will be said that w has connotation CY. 
_ Q(W, a) = f, it will be said that w lacks connotation CY. 
- e(w, a) = u, it will be said that w may either have or lack this connotation, the “or” is 
evidently exclusive. This undefined value might eventually become defined but right 
now it is not. 
The perception, and the values of Q in particular, is part of the definition of an agent, given 
data. This is supposed to capture the intuition that subsymbolic, early perceptual processing 
is innate to the agent and its architecture. The emergence of higher-level perception from 
the sensory-motor-neural apparatus depends on this apparatus itself, the agent’s function 
and internal organization, its gestalt perception, mental imagery, etc. Connotations that 
are alphabetic strings do not necessarily follow their dictionary definitions (if they have 
any). A smelly invisible vapor may, for instance, have the connotation “pink”. This may 
depend on the agent’s own individual architecture, programming and experience. Likewise, 
the issue of why the p-predicate has any one of the three values at a certain point simply 
warrants no discussion. As an example, the undefined u value of the p-predicate may be 
due to ignorance, irrelevance, future contingence or other reasons. From the philosophical 
point of view, these possible reasons are quite different one from the other. In our context, 
however, the actual reason for a specific u value, or whether or not it is already “decided” 
in some transcendental way, is irrelevant. 
4. I. Example perceptions 
Our example environment will be a bookstore environment, where books are the 
w-elements. Agents who “enter” the store have different perceptions of this environment, 
varying with their topics of interest, budget restrictions, goals and reasons for “entering” 
the store. etc. 
Example 2. Let P = (E, Z, Q) be a “catalog” perception where: Z = (science, jiction, 
art, travel, children, cookbooks > . . . . titlel, title2 ) . . , authomame 1, authorname2, , . , 
publisher-l, publiser2, . . . , paperback, hardcover, colorplates, leatherbound, topten, 
reduced, . . . , ISBNI, ISBN2, . . . , pagesl, pages2, . . . , pricel, price2, . . , editionl, 
edition2, . . .). For all books w in & and for all connotations CY E Z, Q(W, a) = t if and 
only if w has that connotation by P. It is f if and only if w does not have that connotation 
by P. It is u if P does not offer any perception of that connotation. In this example (and 
in other typical cases as well) the connotations can be subdivided into “families” (such 
as topic connotations, title connotations, etc.) and the number of different connotations 
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can be very large. ’ However, they all share the same status as elements of Z. Gardenfors 
[21-231 offers to make a distinction among different “quality dimensions” that make the 
“conceptual space”. A distinction in this spirit will follow naturally from our later Boolean 
constructions in Section 9.1. 
Example 3. Let P = (&, Z, Q) be a “customer” perception where: I = (topic-of-interest, 
favorite-author, not-interesting, got-it-already, buy-it, good-price, thick, heard-of-it, 
makes-a-nice-present, in-bad-shape, hmm, . . . }. For all books w in E, e(w, favorite- 
author) = t if and only if w is written by a favorite author of that perception, etc. The 
values of Q are decided individually for every customer perception. In a typical case many 
p-predicate values are u, since most books are closed and lying on the shelves. 
We terminate with two perceptions of a more abstract nature. 
Definition 4. Let & be an environment. The universal perception of & is Z& = (E, 2E, E) 
where: 
_ the set of connotations, 2&, is the field of all subsets of E; 
- for all w E I and for all A c E, E(W, A) = t if and only if w E A, otherwise 
E(W, A) = f. 
The universal perception of E thus has a totally two-valued p-predicate. For any subset 
of books in the bookstore example, for instance, it has a unique connotation that describes 
it accurately. 
Definition 5. Let & be an environment. In the empty perception of E the set of connotations 
is empty. The p-predicate is, of course, degenerate. P, = (E, 0, QN). 
An empty perception cannot relate to its environment 1. 
4.2. Perception morphisms 
Given the variety and individuality of perceptions as above, one needs a way to bridge, 
if possible, the differences between different perceptions. Perception is also known to be 
a dynamic, or “fluid” phenomenon. It changes all the time and one needs channels for 
the flow of change. Perception morphisms (p-morphisms for short) are going to serve as 
a formal tool for this purpose. Suppose that PI = (El, 21, Q,) and P2 = (E2,Z2, e2) are 
two perceptions. We are going to consider cases where the environment is the same for 
both perceptions: El = E2, and hence designated simply E. Since & is fixed, we shall omit 
the first component from the definition of perceptions: P = (I, .Q) is a short designation 
for P = (f, Z, Q). (The cases of paths between perceptions with different environments 
are going to be treated in a separate study.) 
A p-morphism from PI to P2 will be defined as a set mapping of the connotations. 
However, this “translation” between connotations should “make sense”: the essence of 
’ At any point there is, however, only a finite number of active connotations. 
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connotations as meaningful representations of the outside world should be maintained. 
One thus needs to define some “structure preservation” condition on the mapping. The 
formal definition follows: 
Definition 6. Let I be an environment. Consider two perceptions, PI = (Zt , Q I) and 
P2 = (X2, ~2). h : PI + P2 is a perception morphism (p-morphism for short) if the two 
following conditions hold: 
(i) h is a set mapping of the connotations h : 11 -+ 12. 
(ii) h is no-blur: for all w E I, and for all the domain connotations a! E 11, whenever 
QI (w, 0) #u then ez(w, h(a)) = @I (w, a). 
The definite (t/f) values of the p-predicate are preserved by p-morphisms. 
4.3. Examples of perception morphisms 
The following examples illustrate the flexibility of p-morphisms, (often called “arrows”) 
and their ability to bridge between different perceptions (whenever such a bridge is 
possible). We return to the “bookstore” example environment of books, to the “catalog” 
perception of Example 2 and the various “customer” perceptions of Example 3. 
Example 7. Consider two “bookstore” perceptions: Pt = (11, Q,) and P2 = (22, Q?) 
where Zi = [interesting, not-interesting}, with “opposite” tastes-for all books w in E: 
~1 (w, interesting) = Q~(w, not-interesting), 
~1 (w, not-interesting) = ~2(w, interesting) 
h is defined by: 
(interesting Anot-interesting), (not-interesting t-f!+ interesting). 
- It is easy to see that h is no-blur and hence a p-morphism by Definition 6. As 
a matter of fact, it is a rigid case of a p-morphism: no-blur requires the equality 
QZ(W, h(a)) = QI(W, a) to hold only in the definite cases where et (w, cr) # u. 
- h is one-to-one and onto. Moreover, hK’ is also no-blur, so that h has an inverse 
p-morphism and hence the perceptions Pt and Pz are isomorphic. 
Example 8. Consider two “catalog” perceptions of &, PI = (Zt . Q,) and P2 = (22. Q?), 
and a p-morphism h : PI + P2. 
- h may generalize perception in that several domain topics map to a single codomain 
topic in a many-to-one manner, e.g., (math, physics &science). 
- In some cases h could feature a simple translation, for instance if the domain prices 
are in US dollars, while the codomain’s prices are in ECU: 
(price-i( USdollars) tfk price-i(ECU)). 
- The domain perception may not specify certain connotations, such as either topten or 
leatherbound, so that these connotations in the codomain do not have sources under h, 
and hence h features an “expansion”. 
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- In some cases the mapping may be simple, e.g., (topten &:topten), however, topten 
may be undefined for the domain perception et (w, topten) = u but Q~(w, topten) = t 
is defined, so that there is some “unblurring”. 
Example 9. Let PI = (11, Q 1) be a “catalog” perception as in Example 2, and let P2 = 
(12, ~2) be a “customer” perception as in Example 3. Let h : 732 -+ PI be a p-morphism 
based on the mapping: 
(art, travel A topic-of-interest), 
(all other topics. . &not-interesting), 
(prices less than 25 . . A good-price), 
(titleN &heard-of-it), 
(pages more than 400. . . ?+ thick), 
(titleM &got-it-already), 
(topten, reduced A hmm) ,
(leatherbound, colorplates &makes-a-nice-present), 
for all other connotations: (a ?+ blabla-a). 
- The essence of no-blur: books that are art and books that are travel for the catalog 
perception are topic-of-interest for P2. Books that do not cost less than 25 are not 
good-price for P2, etc. However, it may be that, for some book w, et (w, titZe7) = u, 
but Q~(w, got-it-already) = t. 
- Many connotations of Pt , such as ISBN, publisher, etc., map to the respective blabla 
for P2. The intuition of the blabla connotations is that they have no significance for 
P2, although they are perceived by it. (Technically, h has to be defined on all the 
source connotations.) 
_ h is not onto: some P2 connotations (such as buy-it) do not have an h source 
connotation in Pt. Loosely, they are not captured by PI and h. A few possible 
explanations: 
l The connotation buy-it is a function of a combination of catalog connotations, and 
we do not have a way to express it, yet. 
l The customer’s favorite authors are simply not in the authorlist of the catalog 
perception. 
l The catalog perception is unable to perceive that a book is in-bad-shape, while the 
customer’s perception is able to perceive this. 
If the catalog perception serves the store owner, and he also has knowledge of the 
p-morphism h, then h may be considered as a “customer model” that may be used to better 
serve the customer. In a context where individual customers are abstracted as individual 
perceptions, an arrow such as h would constitute the core of a “model” of the customer. 
Customer modeling can be viewed as a special case of user modeling, also mentioned at 
the end of Section 3. 
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Example 10. Let Pt = (1, Q 1) be a bookstore perception, and let P2 = (1, ~2) be a 
perception with the same set of connotations. Let h : P, + P2 be a p-morphism based 
on the identity mapping. By the no-blur property of the p-morphism h, P2 is, in the 
general case, an improvement of P 1: there may be books with imperceptible connotations 
for the domain perception, yet these connotations are definitely perceived by the target, 
improved, perception. In this case h formalizes improvement of perception. (e.g., the books 
are now open so that more things can be perceived about them). The term improvement 
will designate either the improving p-morphism h, the target perception P2, or the target 
p-predicate 42. Since h is the identity on connotations these concepts uniquely imply one 
another. Note that h is one-to-one and onto, yet it is not necessarily an isomorphism: if 
there is some “unblurring” of perception, then h does not have an inverse p-morphism. 
Example 11. Let P be yet another perception that perceives books using connotations 
that stand for the size of the book (X x y x z centimeters), its font and the quality of the 
paper. It is probably impossible to construct a p-morphism from or into any of the example 
perceptions above. 
We terminate with two special arrows: 
Example 12. Let U& = (C, 2’, E) be the universal perception of E, as in Definition 4, then 
for every perception P = (1, Q), there exists a morphism h : P -+ ZA& as follows: 
- Define ?’ = (1, $) to be a totally two-valued perception where z(w, a) = Q(W? (Y) 
if and only if Q(W, cr) # u. This can be achieved from P by an arbitrary choice 
of a definite truth value whenever Q(W, o) = u. The identity mapping on Z defines 
a p-morphism h : P + P: it is no-blur by definition of c. As a matter of fact, it 
is a special case of an improvement morphism (as in Example 10): it is a total 
improvement. 
- There exists a natural p-morphism v : @ -+ U&, which is defined by: n(cr) = (w E 
E IlG(w, a) = t). It is easy to see that q defines a rigid, and hence no-blur p-morphism. 
- It is also easy to see that the composite mapping h = zo q defines a p-morphism from 
” to U&. (As a matter of fact, a composition of p-morphisms is always a p-morphism.) 
- h, and hence also h, is not unique. Its definition introduces two possibilities for every 
u value of P: t or f. 
Example 13. Let P, = (I, 0, QH) be the empty perception of E (as in Definition 5). 
For every perception P of E, there exists a (unique) morphism h : P, + P. It is based 
on the empty mapping of connotations, and it emptily stands the no-blur condition for 
p-morphisms. 
4.4. Categorical,formalization of perception machines 
Having defined perceptions and perception morphisms, we would like to define the 
categoq of perceptions as a basis for a mathematical theory of artificial perceptions. (In 
the same manner the infrastructure for group theory is provided by defining groups, group 
homomorphisms, and the category of groups.) 
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All perception machines (E, Z, Q) with the same first component E will be regarded as 
a collection, soon to be formalized as a mathematical category. 
Definition 14. Prc&, perceptions of I, is the collection of all objects of the form (I, 1, Q), 
called perceptions, where ~5, 1, Q are as in Definition 1. Since E already appears in the 
designation Prc,c, we use (1. Q) instead of (&, 1, Q). 
There are various possible sets E of w-elements, so we are actually defining a family of 
collections. Definition 14 does not discard I, the environment. It rather raises it one level 
higher in the hierarchy. Inside PrCE all perceptions refer to the same environment (such 
as the bookstore environment), so that it becomes redundant in the specification of single 
perceptions. 
Defining Pi-CE as a mathematical category provides infrastructure from a well-developed 
science: category theory. The definition of a category requires that: 
_ One is given a set of objects. 
_ Given any pair of objects P, Q, one has a collection of motphisms f’ : P + & from 
P to Q. Given a morphism such as ,f, P is the domain of f, and Q is the codomain 
off‘. 
_ Morphisms should be closed under composition: given two morphisms f : P -+ Q 
and g : Q -+ R, where the codomain of ,f is the same as the domain of g, one 
may form their composite, f o g, which is a morphism: f o g : P -+ 72, such that 
f 0 g(a) = g(.f (a)) (i.e., apply f, then K). 
- Composition should be associative: ,f o g o h = (f o g) o h = .f’ o (g o h). 
_ For every object P there should be an identity morphism Idp : P -+ P. 
_ The identity morphism should be the (left and right) unit element of composition: for 
everyf:P+Q, Idpof=f=foldQ. 
In our context the objects are perceptions P, Q. . . and morphisms are p-morphisms. The 
remaining requirements can be easily settled, since composition of p-morphisms is defined 
by set composition of the mappings, and the identity p-morphism is defined by the identity 
mapping. 
Lemma 15. PTCE, together with Definition 6 of morphisms (composition of morphisms 
and the identity morphism are defined at the level ef set mappings) is a category. 
The construction and formalization of all perceptual cognitive processes will be trimmed 
in terms of these very few primitives that category theory provides for the study of artificial 
perceptions: perception, p-morphism, domain perception and codomain perception of 
a p-morphism, and composition of p-morphisms. This predicts theoretical as well as 
applicational tidiness. 
A discussion of the basic mathematical properties of the category of perceptions, as 
well as more example applications, is provided by [2]. Already at this point example 
applications of basic categorical notions can be provided: 
Example 16. Consider Examples 8 and 9. If there is a p-morphism h : PI + P2 
translating between two “catalog” perceptions, and there is a p-morphism g : P2 + P3 that 
2. Arzi-Gonczarowski, D. Lehmann /Artijicial Intelligence 102 (1998) 187-247 203 
models a “customer” perception P3 in terms of the catalog perception P2, then a composite 
p-morphism h o g would neatly model the customer’s perception P3 in terms of the catalog 
perception Pt. This opens the way, for instance, to a formalization of cooperation between 
two systems where each one models its own customers. 
A perception should be able, among other things, to preserve its autonomy within a so- 
ciety of other perceptions. The variety can occur between several distinct agents, or within 
one single agent. Some standard categorical tools are capable of formalizing forms of joint 
perceptions, with varying degrees of trust and partnership. They are elaborated in [2]. 
Example 17. Maximal trust using coproducts-a coproduct of a family of perceptions 
is their “least expanded common expansion”: an expansion of perception to include the 
perceptions of the other participants as well. Injecting morphisms are the formal tool that 
puts them together. This kind of joint perceptions could be useful in any one of the many 
cases where there is more than one possible perception of a given environment. It provides 
a neat formal way to go about joining them. 
Partnership in coproduct perceptions may be enhanced by merging connotations that are 
shared by different perceptions (common sense connotations). This can be formally done 
by a proper pushout. 
Minimal trust using products-a product of a family of perceptions is their “least blurred 
common blur”. Example cases where such product perceptions may be useful are cases 
where points of disagreement have to be blurred. Projecting morphisms are the formal tool 
that filters out separate aspects of the joint perceptions. 
Pullbacks are capable of formally restricting the product perceptions to the desired 
subset of connotations that feature definite or possible future agreement. This formalizes 
minimal trust partnerships that concentrate on similarities between the participants. 
4.5. Summary of Section 4 
The domain of discourse of perception machines was formally defined and categorized. 
This provides a well-known mathematical environment within which one can scrutinize 
artificial perceptions. In the sequel this formalization will be justified by showing that tools 
provided by category theory are useful and meaningful to the study of artificial perceptions 
and related cognitive processes. The scrutiny will pay by leading us to more insights and 
to practical constructions and results: it is a means rather than an end by itself. 
5. A natural structure of perceptions 
By merely looking at the examples it can already be observed that a connotation is more 
than just an arbitraty entity which stands all by itself. No matter how a connotation is 
internally represented, once it is tied with the environment E via the perception Q, there 
are certain lawlike orders and patterns which can be observed about it: one connotation 
may suggest another, some connotations come always together while others never do, and 
there are other possible connections as well. All these interlacing connections suggest that 
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Z has an inner structure, induced by & and Q. This is suggestive of more structure in the 
objects of the category Prc&: perception of the environment seems to introduce a structural 
element into the internal representation. 
5. I. Synonyms 
Two connotations may be indistinguishable in that they stand for the same perception 
values. If they could be merged, it could mean a useful extraction of the perceptual essence 
out of the set of connotations, with no duplications and redundancies. This formalizes a 
cognitive process of generalization: forming a general term from particulars. 
Definition 18. Let P = (1, .Q) be a perception, and let (Y, B E 1. a! and /I are synonyms (or 
e-synonyms), denoted a-p, if for all w in & Q(W, w) = Q(W, /l). 2 
It is obvious that: 
Proposition 19. 2: is an equivalence relation. 
The quotient set Z/Z, whose elements are the distinct synonymity equivalence classes, 
will be designated Z*. The predicate Q is of course well-defined on E x Z* as well, and the 
resulting perception will be designated P* = (Z*, Q). 
A change in the set of connotations, from Z to Z*, captures a cognitive process: the 
internalization of synonymity between connotations. It is neatly and easily formalized by 
one of our categorical primitives: a p-morphism. Let P = (Z, Q) and P” = (Z*, Q) Define 
the mapping into the quotient set: Mp : I+ I* : a H [a], where [a] designates the class 
of all synonyms of CX. Obviously: 
Proposition 20. Mp : P + P* is a rigid p-morphism. (Rigid was explained in Exam- 
ple 7.) 
For readers interested in the mathematical-categorical context, a p-morphism is a 
coequalizer if and only if it merges synonyms only [2]. 
Example 21. In Example 3 the following could be synonyms: 
(big-red-sticker-good-price). 
5.2. Subsumptions 
The idea behind synonyms is now relaxed. Instead of two connotations representing 
exactly the same w-elements, one appears to represent a subset of the w-elements 
* In its original understanding synonymity is a relation that holds between linguistic labels, and not between 
connotations. Our reading of this tern, as well as other terns such as “connotation ” is, indeed, inspired by their 
original readings. However, there is no obligation to their exact traditional understanding. 
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represented by the other. The family of w-elements with connotation p has, as “sub- 
family” the w-elements with connotation CX. Taken the other way round, w-elements with 
connotation o seem to always have connotation #l as well. This means that connotation o 
seems to subsume or imply connotation ,!I. 
Definition 22. Let P = (1, Q) be a perception, and let CX’, p E 1. a! subsumes p, denoted 
a~]~,ifforallwinE,e(w.~)=t~e(w,~)=tande(w,~)=f~~(w,w)=f. 
The condition of Definition 22 is designated VW E I Q(W, cr) % Q(W, B). In the 
absence of u values, % becomes the classical two-valued material implication. 
Proposition 23. The a relation is a quasi-order in 1. 
The passage from the set of connotations Z to the set of equivalence classes of synonyms 
Z* was shown to be a rigid p-morphism of (1. Q) onto (Z”, Q). Namely, it rigidly preserves 
the p-predicate Q. Hence subsumptions between elements of 1” can be defined in exactly 
the same way as subsumptions between connotations of 1. Moreover: 
Proposition 24. The subsumption relation a is a partial ordering on Z* 
Example 25. In the universal perception of & (see Definition 4), let A, B E 2& be subsets 
ofE.ThenAaBifandonlyifA& B. 
Example 26. In Example 2 the following subsumptions may be observed (depending on 
the specific perception): 
(Asirnov g science-jiction) (art 9 colorplates). 
The definition of % , 2, 9 are inspired by the definition that Lukasiewicz gave to the 
biconditional and to the conditional (respectively) in his 3-valued logic. The choice of this 
logic was discussed in Section 2. By preserving the law of identity as in Lukasiewicz’s 
logic, any connotation both subsumes itself and is synonym to itself. Without having 
u t, u, connotations that are undefined for some w-elements (i.e., Q(W, (Y) = u) could 
not have been their own synonyms. 
Synonyms and subsumptions need not be universal. In Example 21, for instance, it is 
indeed not a universal truth that reduced price books are marked with big red stickers. 
The practical possibility to treat worlds with special features and patterns is another aspect 
of the subjectivity and flexibility of perceptions. Artificial perceptions “browse” in their 
environments and detect synonyms and subsumptions. 
5.3. Nonmonotonicity of the relations 
If synonyms and subsumptions are to be regarded as structure in the category 
of perceptions, then this structure might naturally be expected to be preserved by 
p-morphisms. However, it can be easily seen that this is generally not the case: let a~$ 
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in a given perception P = (Z, Q). Let w E E be such that Q(W, a) = q(w, fi) = u. Let 
h : P + Q be a p-morphism, where Q = (3, r). By Definition 6 of p-morphisms it may 
be that t(w, h(a)) # t(w, h(p)). In that case h(a)$h(/3). Similarly, if asp, it may be 
that t(w, h(a)) = t but t(w, h(p)) # t. In that case h(a)@(/3). 
Hence, when a p-morphism is applied, either one of the relations 2 and 5 may not 
be fully preserved. This phenomenon will be henceforth called the nonmonotonicity of 
these relations. It was also discussed in the context of our pre-theoretical considerations 
(Section 2.4). 
The example cases used above are such that for some w E I it so happens that 
Q(W, CY) = Q(W, p) = u. It can be easily verified from the definitions of 2: and 9 that 
these are the only ones that represent possible nonmonotonicity under a p-morphism. 
The issue of monotonicity of improvements (see Example IO) and total improvements 
(see Example 12) of perceptions is central to this study. The “open-minded” consideration 
of all possible improvements and total improvements generally means nonmonotonicity. 
On the other hand, restricting the discussion only to monotone improvements and 
monotone total improvements is less “open-minded”, but there are advantages in their 
stability. Whenever a perception is (totally) improved, one of the first questions that will 
be asked is whether the (total) improvement is monotone or not. 
Example 27. The f-total improvement, designated ef, of a perception P = (I, Q), takes 
every u value of perception to an f value: for all pairs (w, a) in E x 1, ef (w, (;Y) = e(w, a) 
if Q(W, a) # u, otherwise ef (w, (zr) = f. This improvement is monotone. It represents an 
acceptable “default” strategy. 
Example 28. The t-totul improvement, designated et, of a perception P = (Z, Q), takes 
every u value of perception to a t value: for all pairs (w, CX) in E x Z, et(w, a) = e(w, w) 
if Q(W, a) # u, otherwise et(w, a) = t. This improvement is monotone as well. 
The idea of monotone total improvements has a conservative flavor. However, there is 
quite a variety within monotone total improvements, and anything which is undefined could 
still turn to be either true or false. (As demonstrated, for example, by the f- and t-total 
improvements.) 
To be able to restrict ourselves to monotone p-morphisms only (including, of course, 
monotone improvements and total improvements), a subcategory is defined within the 
category of perceptions. (A subcategory consists of (subsets of) objects and morphisms 
from the category, such that composition and identities in the subcategory coincide with 
those of the category.) 
Definition 29. Prep, the monotone subcategory ofperceptions, consists of: 
- all the perceptions of Prc&, 
- monotone p-morphisms, h : P + Q, such that CY 9 ,I?J =+ h(cx) a h(b). 
Proposition 30. PrcFon is a subcategory qf’Prc& 
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Example 31. Following Example 21 of synonyms, there may be an improving p-morphism 
(see Example 10) into an improved “customer” perception of the bookstore where some 
books with big-red-stickers are not good-price. In that case the improvement p-morphism 
is not in 7%cy. 
5.4. Summary qf Section 5 
In the quest for structure in the set of connotations one may detect lawlike orders 
and patterns. Two relations were defined and exemplified: synonyms and subsumptions. 
Subsumptions define a quasi-order on any perception, and in *perceptions, where all 
synonyms are merged, one even gets as much as a partial order. Synonyms and 
subsumptions are not necessarily preserved by p-morphisms. For that reason the monotone 
subcategory of perceptions was defined, which constitutes all perceptions, but only the 
p-morphisms that preserve the two relations. 
6. Boolean perceptions 
The previous section gave us a lead to the structure of perceptions: perceptions are 
naturally endowed with a quasi-order, and *perceptions (where synonyms are merged) are 
similarly endowed with a partial order. The structure of a lattice thus comes to mind. Links 
in the lattice may capture relationships which are implicit in a perception. Since the purpose 
of this study is to have agents possess very structured and expressive perceptions, let us 
continue with this suggestive idea even further. Let us see what happens if a perception has 
a set of connotations which has the structure of a complemented and distributive lattice, 
namely a Boolean algebra. This is, in a sense, the most structured form of a partially 
ordered set. Indeed, lattices can alternatively be defined in terms of the two operations 
v and A. On the intuitive level, it is not unnatural to expect that an intelligent artificial 
agent should have a perception of connotations that are Boolean combinations of other 
connotations. In Example 3 it would be natural for perceptions to have connotations such 
as (topic-of-interestr\good-price), or (not-interestingvgot-it-already), or (-thick). 
It is remembered, however, that a quasi-ordered set is still far from being a Boolean 
algebra, and perceptions, as defined so far, do not generally have such a complex structure. 
The gap should somehow be closed. We first define and study perceptions with a Boolean 
set of connotations. Later, we shall examine various ways of marrying the concreteness of 
basic perceptions with the powers of abstraction of the Boolean structure. 
6. I Permits 
If the set of connotations is closed under Boolean connectives, then an arbitrary 
p-predicate (as allowed until now) might violate a certain sense of adequacy to the 
external world. Whereas our original definition of perceptions had every connotation 
perceived independently of the other connotations, the new construct calls for some kind of 
dependence between the p-predicate values of different connotations that are dependent in 
the Boolean sense. As an example, if a w-element has both connotations a! and ,?l, then an 
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agent claiming that this w-element lacks o A p could hardly be described as “intelligent”. 
Technically, this would disgrace the qualification of Q as a predicate. 
Consider the universal perception of Definition 4. Its set of connotations 25 is, of 
course, a Boolean algebra with the set-theoretical operations of conjunction, disjunction 
and complementation. It is easy to see that the universal p-predicate is “well-behaved”. As 
an example, if a w-element in & has both connotations A, B c & then this w-element is an 
element of both subsets A and B. w is thus an element of both their union A U B and their 
intersection A n B, and hence it has the connotation A V B as well as A A B, as expected. 
In the case of a total, two valued, p-predicate there is a known classical manner in 
which a two-valued predicate should be defined on a Boolean algebra. In the present 
case, however, the p-predicate is three-valued. We have to find a sensible way to embed a 
three-valued predicate in a Boolean algebra. This will be first done in a global, categorical 
manner, without surgery into specific w-elements, connotations or predicates. 
The definition of Boolean perceptions will “test” these perceptions against the universal 
perception that was just shown to “behave well”. Such a “test” is neatly cast as a 
p-morphism into the universal perception. By Example 12, p-morphisms from any 
perceptiot P intoihe universal perception always exist: 
_ Let h : P + P be a total improvement o,f P. 
- Define the natural p-morphism q from P into Z& : 
- h = 20 q defines a p-morphism from P to UC. 
h is not unique. For C = (B, a) with a Boolean algebra of connotations to be a 
b-perception, it will be necessary that at least one of these p-morphisms should be based 
on a mapping that is a Boolean homomorphism. 
Definition 32. Let C = (B, o) be a perception such that f? is a Boolean algebra. A permit 
of C, if it exists, is a total improvement of C that yields a natural morphism into Z4& which 
is a Boolean homomorphism of the connotations. 
As with improvements in general (see Example lo), we shall use the word permit to 
designate either the improving p-morphism or, alternatively, the target total p-predicate. 
These two concepts uniquely imply one another. 
Example 33. There are “seemingly well-behaved” total improvements that are not 
permits. Two of them are the f-total and the t-total improvements (Examples 27 and 28). 
In the case where ~(w, fi) = a(w, -/?) = u, any permit should have one of the values t 
and the other f, while these improvements assign the same value to both. 
An improvement (Example 10) consists of assigning definite values to some of the cases 
where the p-predicate has had a u value. It is thus very similar to a partial formation of 
a “possible world” [37]. In case of a total improvement (as in Example 12), there is an 
assignment of definite values to all those cases, and it is thus similar to a total formation 
qfa possible world. If .Q represents a partial perception of the environment, then a total 
improvement G is a total description of one possible perception for (1, Q). 
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A permit thus indicates a possible perception with regard to the incomplete information 
represented by the b-perception (B, a). This possible perception has the additional 
property that it is “sensible”, in that it can be naturally mapped in a Boolean way into 
the universal perception. It thus “arranges” the world I in a sensible way. 
6.2. Definition and categorical status of Boolean perceptions 
Definition 34. Let a perception C = (a, a) be such that B is a Boolean algebra. C is a 
Boolean perception b-perception for short (o is a Boolean perception predicate, b-p-pred- 
icate for short) if: 
(i) it has a permit as in Definition 32; 
(ii) closure of the b-p-predicate: let Vc be the (nonempty) set of permits of C, then, for 
all w E & and for ail ,4 E a: 
t ifGEVc, Z(w,/l)=t, 
f ifVZ?EVc, Z(w,/3)=f, 
u otherwise. 
It is easy to see that the p-predicate o is uniquely determined by the permits. 
Example 35. U& itself is a b-perception with the identity as its unique permit. 
By Definition 32 permits are based on Boolean homomorphisms into the universal 
perception. Since Boolean homomorphisms always map top to top and bottom to bottom, 
then: 
Corollary 36. IfC = (I?, a) is a b-perception, then a(w, T) = t, a(w, I) = f. 
B-perceptions are perceptions by definition, hence they constitute a subset of the objects 
in the category Prc,. This subset will be designated Prc:, and its elements are of the form 
(a, (T) (to make a notational difference from (Z, Q)). To define ‘Prc~ as a subcategory one 
first has to establish the p-morphisms which could be applied within this subcategory. The 
expected, natural, requirement is that the additional, i.e., Boolean, structure be preserved. 
Definition 37, Let Cl = @I, D 1) and C2 = (&, ~2) be b-perceptions. A p-morphism 
f : Ct -+ Cz is a Boolean perception morphism, b-p-morphism for short, if the mapping 
f : BI -+ 132 is a Boolean homomorphism. 
Example 38. In Example 9, if the perceptions involved were Boolean, then a b-p- 
morphism between them would open the possibility for a more complex model of the 
customer such as: 
(authornameNvauthornameA4 Ahmm), 
(artr\leather-boundr-thick & makes-a-perfect-presentr\buy-it). 
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Example 39. Consider color blindness. Let E be any environment of colorful w-elements, 
let Pr be a “red-blind” perception, and let ‘P2 be a “normal” color perception. 
A p-morphism h : PI + P2 needs to use Boolean combinations: 
(yellowgreen A yellowvgreen), (cyanwhite t% cyanvwhite), 
(bluemagenta t% bluevmagenta), 
h 
(blackred t+ blackvred). 
Since Boolean homomorphisms are closed under composition, then: 
Lemma 40. PK: with b-p-morphism.9 is a subcategory qf I&&. 
6.3. Equivalent characterizations of Boolean perceptions 
Definition 34 is an external, categorical one. One might want to fathom its details and 
consequences, and, in particular, to show that the natural expectations from a b-p-predicate 
are fulfilled. The main “internal” result is Lemma 4 1 below. It provides a formulation of a 
necessary and sufficient condition for the recognition of b-perceptions “from inside”. The 
technical details and proofs that lead to this lemma are given in Appendix A. 1. 
Lemma 41. A perception C = (a, a) such that the set B of connotations is a Boolean 
algebra is a b-perception if and only if j??r all w E E: 
(i) The set (/!J E l?(lo(w, /3) = t} is ajltel: 
(ii) The set {/I E Bllo(w, #?) = f) is un ideal. 
(iii) The aboveJilter and ideal are dual one to the other: for all B in B, a(w, #I) = t if 
and only ifa (w, -b) = f. 
The permits of a b-perception are defined by all the possible maximal ideals (and dual 
maximal filters) that include the ideal (and dual filter) of Lemma 41. Classical two-valued 
predicates on a Boolean algebra are characterized by such a division into a maximal ideal 
and a dual maximal filter. This is, in a certain sense, the point where the present study 
meets the classical theory that admits only total descriptions and two truth values. Loosely: 
b-perceptions are neither total nor two-valued, but they have the potential of evolving into 
total two-valued perceptions. 
6.4. Computing Boolean perception predicates 
Any agent that uses a b-perception for practical purposes will eventually deal with 
perception of specific w-elements and their connotations. It might need the value of 
a(w, B) for some w E E and a connotation B E B. While the categorical approach gives 
the whole discussion its formal support, it would not be practical for an agent to deal 
with possible perceptions, ideals, and filters, every time it needs the value of some 
a(w, B). A deductive apparatus is needed to guide the computation of the values of the 
p-predicate directly from the basic perception. Ideals are closed under disjunction and 
under subsumption from below, while filters are closed under conjunction and under 
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Table 1 
Negation in Boolean perceptions 
cr(w,a) u(w. -(Y) 
t f 
f t 
U Ll 
Table 2 
Disiunction in Boolean perceptions, a(w, (Y v B) 
t t t 
t f ” 
t u 
t if (-cr)<b (also (-B)<(Y and (Y v ,!I = T) 
u otherwise 
Table 3 
Con.junction in Boolean perceptions, a(~, (Y A p) 
a(w,B) t f U 
U(W, a) 
t t f U 
f f f f 
U U if&(-B) (also fiQ(-(r) and o1 A p = I) 
otherwise 
subsumption from above. This gives us the insight we needed into the behavior of b-p- 
predicates, and provides us with truth tables: 
Lemma 42. Let C = (i?, o) be a b-perception. The truth tablesfor the b-p-predicate o are 
given by Tables l-3. (In these tables < designates the conventional Boolean partial ordel; 
defined by the Boolean algebraic Law of Consistency.) 
The proof is given in Appendix A. 1. It is noted that the truth tables are not an arbitrary 
choice of some three-valued logic, but rather a result of the global categorical structure. 
6.5. Summar?; qf Section 6 
The category of perceptions has a subcategory of b-perceptions where the sets of 
connotations are Boolean algebras and the p-predicates are restricted accordingly. An agent 
with b-perception has an adequate perception of Boolean combinations of connotations. 
B-perceptions can be characterized in more than one way: 
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_ Their Definition 34 in terms of possible total perceptions (permits) is of a category 
theoretical, global, nature. 
_ B-perceptions can be characterized with the necessary and sufficient Boolean 
algebraic conditions of Lemma 4 1, using proper ideals and their dual proper filters. 
Lemma 42 provides a deductive apparatus that may be algorithmically applied for the 
computation of specific values of the b-p-predicate. These truth tables show that the 
categorical definition yields a p-predicate that is “Boolean adequate” in a certain common 
sense of the term. 
7. Free generation of Boolean perceptions 
A general perception has a quasi-ordered set of connotations (Proposition 23), but this 
is still far from being a Boolean algebra as required for the perceptions of the Boolean 
subcategory presented above. Closing this gap means finding a way to somehow form a 
Boolean version of any perception, and thus marry the concreteness of basic perceptions 
with the powers of abstraction of the Boolean structure. 
For simple perceptions the connection between w-elements and connotations is innate. 
It emerges from the sensory-motor-neural apparatus, and accepted as it is. The main 
property of an agent with this perception is the very fact that it has a direct perception 
of the environment. For b-perceptions, on the other hand, there is already some kind of 
structure imposed on perception. Not every predicate will do, and the predicate is subject 
to an adequacy condition which stems from abstract arguments about the meaning of the 
connectives “or” , “and’, “not”. These connectives do not have an objective existence in 
the environment. They are defined in an abstract way, creations of symbolic processing. 
In this sense b-perceptions have a somewhat abstractive flavor, a flavor one expects from 
cognitive perceptions. 
The following step is to try and combine the advantages of simple perceptions with those 
of b-perceptions. An agent could, hopefully, relate to its environment via direct perception 
as in Prc,, and at the same time process its basic perception in an abstractive way as in 
Pm:. This could be a step towards a certain intuition about artificial cognition. 
The most general Boolean generation over a given perception is introduced and studied, 
then evaluated. 
7.1. Definition of free Boolean perceptions 
Trying to integrate Boolean features into a simple perception naturally means that the 
set of connotations will have to somehow be closed under Boolean operations. At the 
same time one wants to preserve perception of the generating connotations. The categorical 
environment provides a neat formulation of that: If (I, Q) E Prc& is a perception, one is 
looking for a generating p-morphism: 6 : (Z, Q) -+ (I?, a) such that 
- c(Z) is a set of generators for the Boolean algebra B. (This guarantees closure under 
Boolean operations.) 
- < is a rigid p-morphism. (This guarantees that perception of the generating connota- 
tions is preserved.) 
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z c-) 
FL7 
a; 
f 3!h 
t3 
Fig. 1. The free Boolean algebra over 2. 
C = (D, a) could, hopefully, serve as a b-perception for the agent that was, so far, equipped 
with P = (I, Q) only. 
The simplest and most general way to close Z under Boolean operations is to take 
this set of original connotations as free generators. The free Boolean algebra over Z will 
be designated EJ;. Its main property (see Fig. 1) is that for any Boolean algebra L3 and 
for any mapping f : Z + I? there exists a unique extension h of f which is a Boolean 
homomorphism h : Bt + B. One is thus looking for a Boolean generation of the form 
where 23; is freely generated by Z, 4fr is the inclusion map of generators, and it remains 
to define efr. 
For (Z?;, efr) to be Boolean, by Definition 34, it needs to have a permit. Obviously, any 
such permit would be an extension of some total improvement of Q since Z c 235. On the 
other hand, by the freedom of i3;: 
Lemma 43. Let P = (I, Q) be a perception. Let a; be thefree Boolean algebra generated 
over 1. Evey total improvement Fof e can be uniquely extended into a total b-p-predicate: 
$9 x a;+ {t, f]. 
It follows that the Boolean extensions of the total improvements of the generating 
perception P are exactly all the “candidate” permits of a Boolean generation based on 
the free Boolean algebra a: of connotations. For the sake of generality it is desirable that 
all of them should be permits. The p-predicate efr will be thus defined to accommodate all 
these possible permits (the designation zbib’ is used as in Lemma 43). 
Definition 44. Let P = (25, Q) be a perception. The free b-perception over P, designated 
Cfr = (a;, efr), is defined: 
- L?;, the set of connotations, is the free Boolean algebra generated over Z. 
- Let Vp be the set of total improvements of P. efr, the free b-p-predicate, is defined, 
for all w E E and for all p E BF, by: 
t if GE VP, p’(w, B) = t, 
efr(w9 B) = f if Q E VP, p’(w, /I) = f, 
u otherwise. 
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By Definition 44 that uses all total improvements F as a basis for permits, one can 
conclude that cfr does what it was expected to do: 
Corollary 45. [fr(Z) is a set of generators for the Boolean algebra t?$, and tfr is a rigid 
p-morphism. 
Example 46. Let P be a bookstore perception as in Section 4.1. The free b-perception 
over P would have connotations that consist of all possible Boolean combinations of the 
generating connotations, with b-p-predicate values that are computed by the truth tables of 
Lemma 42. 
7.2. Free Boolean generation as a functor 
The generation of a b-perception over any given perception as defined above is a 
mapping from the category of perceptions into the Boolean subcategory: 
Gfr : Prc, + Prc: : P t+ Cfr. 
It comes together with the generating morphism tfr: P -+ Cfr. A few things are to be 
expected from the Gfr mapping, if it is supposed to generate a b-perception over any given 
simple perception in a “methodical” manner: 
(ii) 
If twoperceptions were able to communicate as simple perceptions via a p-morphism 
f : P -+ Q, then this communication should be preserved by Boolean generation: 
Gfr should provide an extension of f which is a b-p-morphism: 
Gf'(f > : GfYP) + G”&?), 
and the diagram in Fig. 2 should be commutative. The only definition that could do 
this is the following: let h : l3; + 23% be the unique extension of the mapping 
Z+t?fj:aH f(a) 
into a Boolean homomorphism such that Va, E Z h(u) = f(a). Define Gfr(f) by 
/I H h(B). (We still have to show that this is a b-p-morphism.) 
The provided communication between the Boolean generations should preserve 
compositions: 
P f 
I 
& 
I fr 6 
fr 
Gf’(f 1 
67(P) Gf’( Q) 
Fig. 2. Boolean perception generation with morphisms. 
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The categorical framework provides well developed concepts for the above: G” needs to 
be afinctor, and cfr should be a natural transfomzation from the identity functor on Prc& 
to the functor Gf*. An immediate example result of this demand is that Gfr should generate 
isomorphic b-perceptions over isomorphic perceptions-a very plausible expectation. The 
functor is thus a formal guarantee that agents are generating b-perceptions in a consistent, 
methodical way. This is an instance where categorization of perceptions provides us with 
tools of scrutiny that capture certain pre-theoretical intuitions about cognitive perceptions. 
Lemma 47. Let P = (T, e), Q = (J, 5), and let f :P --f Q be a p-morphism. Let 
Gfr(P) = (a;, efr), and Gf’(&) = (Bf;, rfr). Let h : B$ + B’j be the unique extension 
of the mapping 
ZiB’j:(Yt+f((Y) 
into a Boolean homomorphism such that V(-Y E Z h(cz) = f(a). Then the mapping 
GfYf> : Gf’(P) -+ GfW)> 
defined by: /3 t+ h(,9), is a b-p-morphism such that the diagram of Fig. 2 is commutative. 
The proof is given in Appendix A.2. The essence of the proof is “rooting” the diagram 
and all involved perceptions into the universal perception, using permit arrows (i.e., 
possible perceptions). Permits and the universal perception constitute the foundations of 
b-perceptions and hence a basis for all proofs. 
It also follows from the definition of Sfr(f) that Gfr preserves compositions and 
identities. and hence: 
Corollary 48. tf” is a natural transformation from the identity functor on Prc& to the 
functor Gf’. 
7.3. Freedom of thefinctor 
There are additional things to expect from the generating functor Gfr that are easily 
categorized. One of them is generality. In categorical terms, this neatly translates to a free 
generation. The following lemma uses a standard category theoretical characterization of 
freedom, as illustrated by Fig. 3. 
Lemma 49. Let P be a perception. Let 
#’ : PrcE + Prc, b’ : P H Cf’ 
be as in Definition 44, and let cf’ : P -+ Gfr(P) be the rigid inclusion of generators. Then 
for any b-perception C = (B, a) and anyp-morphism f : P -+ C there exists a unique b-p- 
morphism @ : Gfr(P) + C such that tfr o 1L_ = f. 
Proof outline. A natural transformation such as cfr always defines a free functor: the 
definition of I++ is similar in nature to the definition of Gfr( f ), and the proof is similar to 
that of Lemma 47, with C replacing Bfr( &) and I/J replacing h. q 
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Fig. 3. Freedom of Boolean perception generation 
7.4. Computing free Boolean perception predicates 
The values of the p-predicate are innate and fixed for the generating perceptions. When 
it comes to the Boolean closure the agent may use the truth tables of Lemma 42. These 
truth tables provide a deductive apparatus which may guide the computation of the values 
of the p-predicate directly from the generating perception. Since Z is a set of generators 
for f3;, the computation will eventually “bottom out” at the generating perception (1, Q). 
In this context we distinguish between two kinds of connotations in @: 
Definition 50. Let B be a connotation in t3:. 
- If /? E Z then it is a simple or generating connotation. 
- If ,13 $ Z then it is a complex or derived connotation. 
In free Boolean generation the subset of complex connotations is, of course, disjoint 
from the subset of simple connotations. Since @ is generated over Z, any j3 E @ is equal 
to a Boolean expression with simple connotations as its atomic expressions. The agent can 
compute efr(w, fi), starting from its immediate perception of the simple connotations that 
make #I and using the truth tables. 
At the end of this study, in Section 10, there is a discussion of some methodological 
fallout, where simple versus complex connotations are discussed in Section 10.1. Simple 
connotations are assumed to be closest to, and readily recognized by, the sub-symbolic 
sensory-motor-neural apparatus of an artificial agent, without further procedure. If (Y is a 
generating connotation, then the value of Q(W, cr) emerges without need of a deductive 
apparatus (this “emergence” could be based, for example, on a neural network). Higher 
level artificial perception of derived connotations in the Boolean closure is achieved with 
due recourse to the deductive apparatus. ’ 
More computational effort would be needed as the expression gets more complex: the 
answer is expected to be as complex as the question. An algorithmic implementation of 
the process should also detect general Boolean BF dependencies within the expression, to 
deal with the lower right entries of the disjunction and conjunction truth Tables 2 and 3. It 
will be rewarded with more definite values. 
3 The reader is reminded that whether or not Boolean perception provides a suitable model of human perception 
is not an issue of this study. 
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7.5. Summary of Section 7 
Free Boolean generation provides a rigorous mathematical description of a methodical 
cognitive transition from basic perceptions to b-perceptions. In addition to basic sensory- 
motor-neural perception, a capability of abstraction is captured by an adequate perception 
of Boolean combinations of connotations. An agent that performs this process may claim 
and show for fact that it is, among other things, methodical (the natural functor), open 
minded, and general (freedom of the generation and of a!$. This cognitive transition 
has some good features, but it is maybe somewhat too free, too general. The following 
sections consist of further attempts for a methodical Boolean generation with, perhaps, 
better features. 
8. Validity and completeness in Boolean perceptions 
The perceptual order relations of subsumptions and synonyms gave rise to the idea that 
the set of connotations is a lattice. B-perceptions were defined to follow that idea, and 
structure a set of connotations as a complemented distributive lattice: a Boolean algebra. 
Given a b-perception C = (f3, c~), it is thus natural to check whether the Boolean algebra 
captures the intended meaning. One needs to compare two order relations within the carrier 
set B of connotations. 
- The Boolean partial order, denoted <. It is a formal construct that comes with the 
Boolean algebra, defined by the Boolean algebraic Law of Consistency: 
a</3 ifandonlyif ar\lB=_L ifandonlyif -avB=T. 
- The perceptual quasi-order, denoted a, and set by Definition 22: 
~ if and only if VW E E a(w, (;Y) % a(w, B) 
This order relation emerges from the agent’s perception. It describes perceptible 
patterns and was extensively discussed in Section 5.2. 
In this context of comparison between 9 and < within b-perceptions, we define: 
Definition 51. A b-perception C = (a, a) is valid if, for all (;Y, /3 E B, w<p + CY~B. 
In a valid b-perception all the Boolean subsumptions reflect perceptible o-subsumptions. 
To justify the Boolean structure, b-perceptions should be, at least, valid: patterns 
reflected by the structure should be supported by perception. This was the motivation for 
b-perceptions (see Section 6). 
Example 52. The universal perception UC, is valid: for all A. B c E, A c B + Aa B. 
The corresponding concept of completeness comes immediately to mind, with the 
converse implication: wG/I =+ a</?. In a complete b-perception all perceptible patterns 
should be reflected by the Boolean structure. This also captures a certain intuition about 
the Boolean structure serving as a “mental image” that is generated by perception. 
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Before embarking on the actual definition of completeness in b-perceptions, we need to 
restrict the definition of 9 for these perceptions. This extra care is warranted by the three- 
valued context. Assume that, in a b-perception C = (a, a), there are two connotations, 
U, fi E B, such that, for all w E &, a(w, a) = a(w, B) = u. It follows that a! and p are 
synonyms, also with their negations, and all the following a-subsumptions hold: 
694, a+B, -waB> ycr+/3. 
If one substitutes all of them for the Boolean partial order <, one gets a degenerate Boolean 
algebra: -L = T. This is, of course, undesirable. The most one might want to do in this 
situation is merge the synonyms cz and /I into one connotation (see Section 5.1). 
It is also easy to verify that this kind of problem occurs only in the mentioned situation 
where VW E E n(w, a) = cr(w, /3) = u. 
Definition 53. Let C = (B, a) be a b-perception, and let a!, /I E B. Then crap if: 
_ VW E & a(w, a) % (T(w, B) as in Definition 22. 
- There exists some w E E such that either o (w, cr) # u or o (w, B) # u. 
We are now ready to define: 
Definition 54. A b-perception C = (a, (T) is complete if, for all a!, j3 E 13, agp =+ a</?. 
Example 55. The universal perception UC is complete: for all A, B c I, A a B =+ A C B. 
This follows directly from its Definition (4). 
Having defined validity and completeness for b-perceptions, we proceed to examine 
where they hold. Validity of all b-perceptions is based on the validity of their permits: 
Proposition 56. Let C = (i3, a) be a b-perception, let w<B, and let F? be any one of its 
permits. Then, for all w E E, c(w, a) 2 ?(w, 6). 
Proof. By the Law of Consistency and by the natural q :c + U& being a Boolean 
homomorphism one gets (overline designates set complementation): 
fl= 17(l) = Il(o A -B) = n(o) fl n(B). 
It follows that for no w E E could it be that both w E q(a) and w E n(p) at the same time. 
Hence, for all w E I and for all permits %, z(w, a) 2 z(w, /3). q 
By the closure condition of Definition 34 it follows that, for all w in E, also 
a(w, a) % a(w, B), and hence: 
Corollary 57. B-perceptions are valid. 
Example 58. By Corollary 57 free Boolean generation of Section 7 is valid: for all 
o, B E B$, crq3 =+ crap. 
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As might have been expected, completeness is scarcer than validity. It turns out that 
there is a connection between completeness of a b-perception and the monotonicity of its 
permits. 
Proposition 59. In a complete b-perception all permits are monotone. 
Proof. Let C = (a, a) be a complete b-perception, and let F? be any one of its permits. By 
completeness cr 9 p implies fy < j?, and by Proposition 56 this implies that, for al1 w E E, 
Z(w, a) 2 F(w, j3). 0 
To show incompleteness of a general free Boolean generation, recall that by generating 
the free Boolean algebra over the set Z of connotations, we ignored e-subsumptions 
between them. These subsumptions are not reflected by the Boolean structure. The Q- 
subsumption relation in P = (1, Q) is a subset of the a-subsumption relation in Cfr = 
($, efr) (by rigidity of the generating morphism tfr). In Section 5.3 it was shown that, 
in the general case, P has total improvements G that are nonmonotone. They extend to 
permits of Cfr that do not preserve a of P, and hence they are nonmonotone permits of 
Cfr. It is concluded that: 
Lemma 60. Free Boolean generation is, in the general case, incomplete. 
We have thus observed two disjoint sources for the perceptual order relation 9 in a free 
Boolean generation: 
_ By validity in Cfr, tr<b implies that asp. These subsumptions are based on abstract 
“logical speculations”. They are monotone in the sense that they will hold with any 
permit (i.e., any possible improvement of perception). 
- Observed lawlike patterns, the e-subsumptions that hold between the generating 
connotations. They are based on perceptual observations of “facts”.4 They are 
the cause of nonmonotonicity of some permits of C”‘, and also the cause of 
incompleteness of C”. 
Complete b-perceptions constitute a subset, designated PKJF~~~. of the objects of Prc, 
and of Prc!. It is easy to see that: 
Lemma 61. Prc~cmp with b-p-morphisms is a (full 5, subcategory qf the subcategory 
Prci’ of b-perceptions. 
It was just shown that Prc! # Prcblxmp & . On the other hand, by Example 55, PrcF-cmp 
is not empty: the universal perception is a complete b-perception. 
4 Perception follows, in this context, the scientific enquiry principle H.vpotheses nonjngo [I 1, p. 2611. 
5 Full means that all b-p-morphisms between perceptions are “inherited” from R-C!, so that %F-cmp is fully 
determined by its collection of perceptions. 
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8.1. Completion of Boolean perceptions 
Consider an incomplete b-perception C = (a, c). “Internalization” of all observed 
o-subsumptions aab means actually changing the structure of the Boolean lattice of 
connotations, “moving things around” in order that a </I should hold as well. The situation 
may be figuratively compared to the situation of an analyst who internalizes all the 
experimental ab results. That done, he may lean back in his armchair, close his eyes, and 
figure out all the rest. (Eventually he may open one eye to ask for additional experimental 
results, namely improved generating perception.) 
We shall now use the categorical framework and Boolean tools for a methodical 
modification of any b-perception (and free Boolean generation in particular) so that it 
should not only be valid, but complete as well: the artificial agent will thus have a rigorous 
tool for the internalization of its perceptual observations and the creation of a meaningful 
cognitive image of its environment. 
Let C be a b-perception. In the categorical, arrowed, context one is looking for a 
b-p-morphism t . cmp C -+ ??, such that c = (8, F) is complete: whenever aajl holds then 
a <j3 holds as well. c could, hopefully, replace C as the agent’s b-perception. A few natural 
requirements are: 
_ In the case where C is already complete ccrnp should be the identity. 
- ccrnp should be o-monotone: the idea is to preserve the a-subsumptions, not to discard 
them. 
- tcmp should introduce a minimal modification of C: no change except for that which 
is needed for completeness. 
There are standard Boolean concepts (related to the Boolean algebra of connotations f?) 
that can neatly do what we want: 
_ The set of elements: S = {a! A -p]] crag). 
- Theideal A thatisgeneratedbys, A = (/3 E BII/~~V,~,~S). 
_ The quotient algebra: a = B/A. 
_ The natural Boolean homomorphism into the quotient algebra: 
<cmp : B + 13: /3 H [/!I] 
By definition of the natural homomorphism, [a] = [B] if and only if a G’ B. This 
“congruence modulo A" means that w A -B E A and jl A -CX E A. In particular, 
[I] = [B] if and only if /I E A. 
It is easy to see from the definitions of S, A, and a that: 
- a-subsumptions are integrated into the Boolean algebra B: crap implies a Boolean 
subsumption in B: [a] < [B]. 
- If C is already complete then S = n = (I], and hence ccmp is the identity. 
_ If B turns to be a set of connotations for a b-perception then, by validity, tcrnp will 
define a a-monotone p-morphism. 
- tcmp introduces the minimal necessary modification of a, because A is the smallest 
ideal that includes S. 
a is thus the candidate set of connotations for c (in Appendix A.3, Lemma A.4, it is shown 
that B is not a degenerate Boolean algebra). 6 cmp is the candidate for the b-p-morphism 
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onto ??. It remains to properly define a p-predicate for ??. This will be done in the obviously 
expected manner: 
Definition 62. Let C = (B, a) be a b-perception. Its completed perception, ?? = (13, (T), 
consists of: 
- a as defined above is the Boolean set of connotations; 
- the p-predicate a : E x B -+ (t, f , u), where: 
t if Jo! Z B such that a(w, a) = t, 
a(w, L/31) = f if 3c~ Z B such that cr(w, a) = f, 
u otherwise. 
In Appendix A.3, Proposition A.6, it is shown that there is no conflict in the definition. 
To establish the legitimacy of the construction, we show in Appendix A.3, Proposi- 
tion A.7 through Corollary A. 13, that: 
- ?! has permits. Its permits are, exactly, all the monotone permits of C (it is also shown 
that C does have monotone permits). 
- The p-predicate ?Y answers the closure condition for b-perceptions, from Defini- 
tion 34. 
- ccmJ’ defines a b-p-morphism. 
The main result of this section (proven in Appendix A.3) is: 
Lemma 63. Let C = (t3, a) be a b-perception. Its completed perception c = (B, F) of 
Dejinition 62 is a complete b-perception. 
It is also shown (Corollary A.14) that the 0 subsumptions are exactly the (T- 
subsumptions: no new subsumptions are added. 
Example 64. Consider a completion of the free b-perception that is generated over the 
perception of Example 3. If (in-bad-shape $fr -buy-it), then in the completed perception 
one gets also (in-bad-shape < -buy-it), as part of the Boolean structure. Intuitively, this 
subsumption is “mentally internalized”. 
8.2. Completion as a freejkctor 
As argued in Section 7.2, a general and methodical cognitive transition is best formalized 
by a free functor and a natural transformation. The transition from a b-perception to a 
complet;,kierception (as just described) will thus be formalized by a free functor (Omp) 
into Prc, , @“P(C) = ??, and we will show that 6 cmp is a natural transformation from 
the identity functor on the domain subcategory to the functor Gcmp. In particular, if two 
b-perceptions were able to communicate using a b-p-morphism f :C + C’, then Gcmp 
should provide a b-p-morphism for communication between the completed perceptions: 
G’“P(f) : G”“P(C) + G-ye’). 
Such that the diagram in Fig. 4 should be commutative. However, the results of the former 
Section 8.1 predict that only monotone b-p-morphisms f could fit into that diagram. 
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c f(monotone) 
I -w III 
c’ 
E CmP 
G”“*(f) 
G”““(C) GCrnP(C’) 
Fig. 4. Boolean perception completion with morphisms 
In the general case, there may be b-p-morphisms in Pt-I$ that are nonmonotone. 
This may be exemplified in the context of free b-perception generation, with which 
we are familiar from Section 7: assume that, in a given perception P = (Z, Q), sag. 
Assume further that P communicates, using f : P -+ Q, with a perception Q = (3, t), 
but f(cz)$J@), so that f is non-e-monotone. Consider the respective free Boolean 
generations Gfr(P) and Gfr(Q). In Gfr(P), aafi holds, but a@ because a and B are 
free generators. In Gfr(Q), f(cr)gf(B), because f(a) and f(B) are free generators and 
because f(cr)$f(B). f can be extended to a b-p-morphism between the respective free 
Boolean generations: 
G”(f) : GfYP) + GfY&L 
and this extension preserves ,f(P) (see Fig. 2), so that 
4”V)(Q@(f)(B). 
Let us now “complete” the b-perceptions G”(P) and G”(Q), into Gfr(P) and Gfr(&), 
respectively. Gfr(f) cannot be properly extended to a b-p-morphism between these 
complete b-perceptions, since now OI<~ but f(cz)gf(p). 
Example 65. Consider two “bookstore ” “customer” perceptions as in Example 3. Assume 
that, in P = (1, Q), (buy-it iheard-of-it). Assume that P communicates, using (a! &,a), 
with a perception Q = (3, t), but (h(buy-it)gh(h ear&of-it)), so that h is non-e- 
monotone. The story in everyday words: P buys any book only after having heard of 
it. P is not certain whether he has heard about a specific book, and therefore he is also 
not certain whether he wants to buy that book. Q does not have the same rules, says “so 
what!” and is ready to buy the book in spite of not having heard of it. They are having a 
row because of that. They usually communicate well, but some rules of P keep causing 
trouble between them. h can be extended to a b-p-morphism between the respective free 
Boolean generations, but it cannot be properly extended to a b-p-morphism between the 
complete b-perceptions. P and Q could pursue “casual” communication only, using their 
basic apparatus (namely h), or free Boolean generation (namely gfr(h)) at most (e.g., 
they can talk about the weather-basic perception with, perhaps, some heady but neutral 
logical speculations). Introduction of “own” lawlike structures by way of completeness 
ruins the communication. The anthropomorphism should not be misleading. Humans 
communicate for a multitude of motives. We are capable of containing, even enjoying, 
this kind of trouble. Artificial perceptions are conceived for practical purposes, so that 
nonmonotonicity cannot be ignored. 
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C&, s”““(C) 
v f 3!$, (monotone) “I 
Fig. 5. Freedom of Boolean perception completion 
We are thus going to define a functor G cmp for the completion of b-perceptions on a 
subcategory, designated PK$-~~~, that includes all b-perceptions but only monotone b-p- 
morphisms. Qmp will be a free functor, and [ cmp will be a natural transformation from the 
identity functor on PK~-~‘” to Gcmp: 
Lemma 66. Let C be a b-perception. Let 
Gcmp . p+-mon + prC;cmp. . c b+ c, pp : c --+ G”“P(C) 
be as in Definition 62. Then for any other complete b-perception C’ andfor any monotone 
b-p-morphism ,f : C -+ C’, there exists a unique b-p-morphism $ :c + C’ such that 
6 cmp 0 1cf = f (see Fig. 5). 
Proof. Define @ by [#?I H f(p). Clearly, tcmp o $ = f, and the definition is unique 
since ccmp is onto. @ is a b-p-morphism by f being one, and by showing that, for all 
a’, /I E 13, u “= B implies that f(a) = f(B). The proof is similar to that of Proposition A.8 
of Appendix A, with the Boolean monotone f replacing 2, completeness of C’ replacing 
that of the universal perception, and _L replacing 0. q 
8.3. Summary of Section 8 
Artificial agents with b-perceptions may perform a methodical cognitive transition 
to complete b-perceptions. The transition consists of a complete internalization of 
perceptually observed patterns into the Boolean structure. The process is formalized by 
a free functor from the subcategory of b-perceptions with monotone b-p-morphisms into 
the subcategory of complete b-perceptions. However, b-perceptions with nonmonotone 
communication cannot pursue this communication after the transition. 
9. Sketching complete Boolean perceptions 
In the last two sections two free generations were introduced. The first free functor, Gfr, 
generates a b-perception over any perception. The second one, G”“P, generates a complete 
b-perception over any b-perception. If one considers them as simple mappings between sets 
of perceptions, then the set of b-perceptions is both the codomain of Gf’ and the domain of 
G cmp, so that the mappings can be composed: 
Gfr 0 prnP : Pi-c& + PrcFXmp. 
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Fig. 6. Composite generation with morphisms. 
This is, however, not a legitimate composition of functors, since the domain P$-mo” 
of Gcmp is a restriction of the codomain D-c! of G”, and Gcrnp is undefined for 
the nonmonotone morphisms of PC!. The composite mapping can be applied to any 
perception P = (1, Q) . This would yield the perception 
4fi 0 QmP (p) = c” 
that is valid and complete. The benefits of such a perception to an artificial intelligent agent 
were discussed in the previous section. We would like to study under what conditions the 
composite mapping does define a free functor. Such a functor, if it exists, would define 
a free complete b-perceptions generation. By Section 8 one has to eliminate from Prc& 
the p-morphisms that yield, under Gfr, nonmonotone morphisms in ‘Prc! (see Fig. 6). In 
other words, certain communication paths between the generating perceptions will have to 
be eliminated for complete b-perception generation. Total improvements are also cases of 
p-morphisms, and some of them will have to be eliminated as well. (Indeed, we already 
know that the resulting complete b-perceptions are less general than free Boolean genera- 
tion in that they have less permits.) We ask what exactly is the price in open-mindedness, 
namely in total improvements of P and in communication paths. The non-@-monotone 
p-morphisms (and total improvements) of P will obviously have to go: they extend to non- 
efr-monotone b-p-morphisms of C”. It seems, however, that the price is higher than that: 
Example 67. Let a, /I E Z be two generating connotations such that, using truth tables of 
efr as in Section 6.4, for all w E E, 
@(W, a) = Qf’(W, a) = Q”(W -/3) 1 . 
Clearly, cx and -j3 are Qfr-synonyms, as well as /I and -cr. (In a bookstore perception 
these could be cr = paperback and fi = hardcover.) Assume now that, for some w E E, 
Q(W, a) = Q(W, @) = u. The f-total improvement (of Example 27) will definitely map 
neither pair of synonyms into the same universal perception connotation. This total 
improvement is thus excluded from the domain of G ‘W because it is not a Qfr-monotone , 
permit of Cfr, although it is e-monotone! 
In Section 8 we have observed two disjoint sources for the perceptual order relation +: 
the Boolean < and the observed 9. However, the last example is neither a free Boolean 
Z. Arzi-Gonczarowski, D. Lehmann /Art$ciaE Intelligence 102 (1998) 187-247 225 
subsumption, nor a e-synonym or subsumption. There could be “links of a third kind’, 
traces of some Boolean structure in generating perceptions. Complete Boolean generation 
forces us to discard p-morphisms that are not committed to that structure. 
9.1. Boolean sketches 
Boolean sketches are formal structures that capture traces of Boolean structure in 
generating perceptions. It is a useful tool for definition and understanding of complete 
Boolean generation. Let K be a set. We designate by KBE the set of all Boolean expressions 
over K. Clearly, elements of lCBE can be identified with elements of any Boolean algebra 
B that includes K, and, in particular, with elements of the free Boolean algebra over K, 
designated t3:. A Boolean Sketch consists of a set K, together with a quasi-order on KBE 
that extends the usual Boolean partial order. Formally: 
Definition 68. A Boolean sketch is a pair (K, R) where: 
- K is a set. 
- R is a quasi-order on KBE. 
_ R has a Boolean proper@ let <bt-fr designate the Boolean partial order on BE, then 
for all Boolean expressions er , e2 E KBE, el <&fr e2 implies that el Re2. 
Hence the smallest quasi-order R for (K, R) is R = <bl_fr. 
Example 69. Every Boolean algebra B is a Boolean sketch (B, <). 
Example 70. If A c B is any subset of the elements of a Boolean algebra 13 then (A, <) 
is a Boolean sketch. 
The following example is the Boolean sketch that we need: 
Example 71. Let P = (1, Q) be a perception, and let q,,” be the perceptual order relation 
of the free b-perception Cfr = (a;, efr), then (1, a+,) is a Boolean sketch. Q has the 
required Boolean property by validity of Cfr. 
Clearly, 9 of (Z, Q) is included in +, but there are other sketch subsumptions and 
synonyms, as well as other relationships in (1, !,r,). We designate, for all x, y E KBE: 
- x subsumes y if xRy. 
- x1 y are synonyms if x Ry and y Rx. 
- x, y are disjoints if x R-y and y R-x. 
_ x, y are complements if -x Ry and -y Rx. 
_ x, y are antonyms if they are both disjoints and complements. 
Clearly, in (1, qprr), if x, y are atomic expressions and x subsumes y, then one gets the 
familiar e-subsumption, and the same goes for synonyms. Disjoints, complements, and 
antonyms cannot be expressed with Q-synonyms and subsumptions. It is easy to see that, 
for all expressions x, y E 1: 
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- They are disjoints if and only if for all w E &: 
~(w,x)=t+~(w,~~)=f and ~(w,y)=t+~(w.x)=f. 
- They are complements if and only if for all w E E: 
@(w,x)=f+~(w,y)=t and ~(w,y)=f+e(w,x)=t. 
- They are antonyms if and only if for all w E E: 
~(w,x)=t+~(w,y)=f and ~(w,y)=t+&w.x)=f. 
The Boolean sketch structure is thus capable of capturing “links of the third kind” as 
suspected before. 
Example 72. In a bookstore perception, the following patterns could exist: 
_ edition 1 subsumes -paperback. 
- paperback and -hardcover are synonyms, 
and hence paperback and hardcover are antonyms. 
- For N # h4 priceN and priceA are disjoints. This is actually an observation that a 
book can have at most one price in the given environment. 
_ ISBNn and V(ISBNk]++, are complements. This is actually an observation that a book 
must have some ZSBNi in the given environment. 
_ publisherN and V(publisherK}K+iv are antonyms. This is actually an observation 
that a book must have exactly one publisher in the given environment. 
Indeed, this is only an example of one possible perception with a specific environment. 
There may be environments that feature, for instance, books that are co-published. In that 
case the last item above would not hold. As explained before, perceptions are not meant to 
reflect patterns that are necessarily “universal”. 
In Example 2 “families” of connotations were observed (such as topic connotations, 
title connotations, etc.). The formulation of disjoints, complements and antonyms (and 
other Boolean patterns) as above intrinsically defines these families, similar in spirit to 
the “quality dimensions” of a “conceptual space” suggested by GLdenfors [2 l-231. These 
“families” will be naturally integrated into the Boolean structure. 
Mappings between Boolean sketches that preserve the sketch structure will be a useful 
concept for complete Boolean generation. To be able to formulate the preservation of the 
sketch structure, one first needs to define the meaning of a set mapping when applied to the 
Boolean expressions over the set. This will be done in the obvious way: Let .f’ : K 1 + Icz 
be a set mapping. We define f’ : KyE + ICfE. By replacing every atom a E ICI in the 
domain expressions by f(a) E K2 in the target expression. This is formally done by 
induction on the structure of the expression: if e = a E ICI then f(e) = f(a), if e = -e’ 
then f(e) = -f(e’), etc., . 
Definition 73. Let (Xl, RI) and (X2, R2) be two Boolean sketches. A set mapping 
f:Kl -+ Ic2 is a Boolean Sketch Morphism f‘: (Kl. RI) + (X2, R2) if, for all el.e2 E 
KyE, el Rle2 implies that f(el)Ra,f’(ez). 
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Example 74. Boolean algebras are a special case of Boolean sketches (as in Example 69). 
In that case Boolean homomorphisms between them are Boolean sketch morphisms. 
Example 75. Consider a Boolean sketch as in Example 70. The restriction of a Boolean 
homomorphism on the relevant subalgebra that is generated by A is a Boolean sketch 
morphism. 
The sketch morphisms that we are after are arrows between Boolean sketches (I, +) 
as in Example 7 1. The following lemma follows directly from the definitions: 
Lemma 76. Let f : P --f &heap-morphism (P = (Z, Q), & = (J, 5)). Let (a$, ef’) and 
(“5, t fr) be the corresponding free Boolean generations. Then 
f : (Z, $“) --f u-, a,fr) 
is a Boolean sketch morphism if and only if 
Sf’(f> : G”(P) -+ G”(Q) 
is N e’r-monotone b-p-morphism. 
The connection of Boolean sketches to the issues of this section is obvious now. 
Lemma 76 provides the required information about the p-morphisms that are able to 
“survive” a natural transformation that is based on the composite mapping efr o ccmp: the 
ones that are sketch morphisms. Establishing the formal categorical framework for that 
will lead to a better understanding of the completion process. 
Lemma 77. Boolean sketches with sketch morphisms (composition and the identity sketch 
morphisms are dejned at the set level) form a category 
Definition 78. Let P = (I, Q) and Q = (J, t). f : P -+ Q is a sketch structured p- 
morphism if the set mapping f defines a Boolean sketch morphism 
f: (2, a,tr) + (3, $tr). 
Example 79. Sketch structured p-morphisms and (total) improvements are monotone. 
However, there are monotone such arrows that are not sketch structured. For instance, 
the f-total improvement and the t-total improvement of Examples 27 and 28 do not 
necessarily preserve sketch complements, disjoints, or antonyms. The counter examples 
are, as in Examples 33 and 67, based on cases where u and fi are complements, disjoints, 
or antonyms, but some w E E is such that Q(W, cr) = Q(W, j3) = u. 
To restrict oneself to consideration of perceptions with sketch structured morphisms 
only, another subcategory of perceptions is introduced. 
Definition 80. Prci’, the sketch structured subcategory of perceptions, consists of: 
- all the perceptions of Prc&; 
- sketch structured p-morphisms only. 
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Fig. 7. Complete Boolean perception generation with morphisms. 
Obviously, Prczk IS a subcategory of Prc, and of Prep 
Example 81. Consider the sketch structured subcategory of bookstore perceptions. If a 
perception P features the sketch antonyms 
paperback and hardcover 
then all the sketch structured p-morphisms h from this perception should preserve that 
pattern: 
h@perback) and h(hardcover) should be sketch antonyms in h(P). 
We are now finally ready to define the functor that generates a complete b-perception over 
any given perception, and to show its natural transformation and freedom properties (by 
Lemma 76). 
Corollary 82. Dejine the functor Gfrqmp :Prep -+ PrcyCmP by: 
@-J(p) = Q’ 0 G’“P(P), g=“‘P(f) = g’ 0 q”“(f), 
- 
then tfr o tcrnp : (T, Q) + Cfr is a natural transformation from the identityfunctor on Prczk 
to thefunctor SfrxmP, Gfrxrnp is free, and communications are preserved in a way that the 
diagram of Fig. 7 is commutative. 
9.2. An internal view offree complete Boolean generation 
Boolean sketches and the sketch structured subcategory of perceptions have enabled the 
definition of a free generation GfrXrnp of a complete b-perception over any given percep- 
tion. This is the global, categorical framework. It provides an external characterization of 
-- 
@=mp(P) = (a;, err). 
Having defined Boolean sketches, one can further acquire characterizations of $ and 
- 
efr in terms of the generating perception P = (Z, Q), rather than in the general terms of 
Definition 62. 
We start with the characterization of the Boolean algebra of connotations for free 
complete Boolean generation. Given a Boolean sketch (K, R), the quasi-order R (with its 
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Fig. 8. The free sketch structured Boolean algebra 
“Boolean property”) provides a “sketchy” information about the structure of some Boolean 
algebra over K. Sketch synonyms and subsumptions, as well as complements, disjoints, 
and antonyms should all be built into this Boolean algebra. By the standard category- 
theoretical procedure, one is looking for a Boolean algebra L3p and a sketch morphism 
Lemma 83 (See Fig. 8). Let {K, R) be a Boolean sketch. In l?: (thefree Boolean algebra 
over K), let AR be the ideal that is generated by the set S = (el A -ez(lel Rez}, let 
t32 = @/AR be the quotient Boolean algebra, and let tSk : BE -+ BF be the natural 
Boolean homomorphismfrom the Boolean algebra onto its quotient algebra. Then for every 
other Boolean algebra 23 and every sketch morphism f : (K, R) -+ f? there exists a unique 
Boolean homomorphism + : Bg + x3 that is a homomorphic extension off : for all cy E K, 
C 
Sk o $(a) = f(a). Z?E will be called the free sketch structured Boolean algebra over 
K, R). 
Proof outline. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 66 in Section 8.2, using the freedom 
of i?E, and showing that connotations that are congruent modulo AR are mapped by the 
sketch morphism f to the same element of 8. q 
Replacing the general (Kc, R) by (37, Q), one gets the free sketch structured Boolean 
algebra over (I, Q), designated 23, . Sk On the other hand, in the general Boolean con- 
struction of Section 8.1, one may replace (@, efr) for C = (B, 0.). In that case AR 
above replaces A and one gets the following characterizations, in terms of the generating 
perception P: 
- 
@r = gsk 
Z Z’ < 
cmp = <Sk, 
It remains to fathom the permits of free complete b-perceptions and their p-predicates. - 
The categorical Definition 62 provides theoretical support but not much insight into efr. 
By substituting the universal perception 24~ instead of the general C in the freedom 
Corollary 82 of Gfrsrnp, one can see that the permits of the free complete b-perception over 
P = (Z, Q) are exactly the Boolean extensions of the sketch structured total improvements 
of P. It was shown in Section 8.1 that G frXmP(P) has permits, and hence every P has 
sketch structured total improvements. 
The internal view of free complete b-perception generation can thus be summarized 
by the following characterization. (A comparison with Definition 44 of free Boolean 
generation is recommended.) 
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Lemma 84. Let P = (I, Q) be a perception, then the,free complete b-perception over P, 
@*“P(P) = (By, ecmp), is such that: 
- t?gk, the set of connotations, is the free Boolean algebm generuted over the Boolean 
sketch (Z, +). 
_ Let Vgk be the set of all sketch structured total improvements of P, then ecmp, the free 
complete b-p-predicate, is defined, for all w E E and for all B E t?;k, by: 
ILI otherwise. 
_ The generating morphism is tSklz : (z, Q) cf (BF, ecmp) 
- 
Indeed, efr = ecmp. Th e c h aracterizations introduced by Lemma 84 are in terms of the 
generating perception P. 
9.3. Boolean generations: evaluation and tying of ends 
The artificial agent, endowed with a basic perception and willing to make a methodical 
cognitive transition to a b-perception, now has a choice between free Boolean generation 
and free complete Boolean generation. This flavor of “self-awareness” is enhanced by the 
categorical framework that allows a rigorous comparison between the two. Whatever the 
choice, it can be argued, possibly using the agent’s own data. Both processes are natural 
transformations and both are general. 
The most obvious differences between the two generations are along a tradeoff line 
between open-mindedness on one side and completeness on the other side: free generation 
is more open-minded in that it retains all communication paths (i.e., p-morphisms) with 
other perceptions, and in that it does not rule out any future possible improvement 
of its perception. For that purpose it ignores all perceptually observed patterns that 
it might have been able to notice. Free complete generation is less open-minded: to 
gain completeness of its cognitive Boolean image of the environment it stops non- 
structured communications with other perceptions (loosely: “those that do not agree with 
its conjectures that are based on perceptually observed patterns”), and it rules out some 
future improvements of its perception (loosely: “those that would defy its conjectures that 
are based on perceptually observed patterns”). The elimination of the non sketch structured 
p-morphisms might not be a loss after all. Actually, one gets a means of distinction 
between “deeper” and “shallower” communications (see Example 65). Sketch structured 
p-morphisms communicate between perceptions that possess, in a certain sense, similar 
cognitive inner images, and this communication enhances the similarity. In a case where 
more than one p-morphism could communicate between two perceptions, it is clear that a 
sketch structured one, if it exists, should be “preferred’. 
Another issue for comparison is combinatorial. Free Boolean generation creates a 
Boolean set of connotations with 22” elements for n generating connotations. It is the 
largest possible Boolean closure. In particular, if the generating perception happens to 
be already Boolean, free Boolean generation is unable to “sense” that and it leads to a 
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combinatorial disaster. Free complete Boolean generation, on the other hand, is sensitive 
both to Boolean structure and to completeness. Whatever traces of Boolean structure 
the generating perception has, they are built into the Boolean closure. In particular, if 
the generating perception is already Boolean, it will only be completed, and if it is 
already a complete b-perception then free complete Boolean generation is the identity. The 
minimization of the number of connotations is maximal: there are no distinct synonyms 
and hence no redundancy of connotations in free complete Boolean. 
The above “smallest Boolean closure” feature of free complete Boolean generation has 
other effects. The transition from the totally free Boolean closure to a smaller quotient 
algebra means, inevitably, a many-to-one b-p-morphism. Distinct connotations in the free 
Boolean closure 23; are merged. This may, among other things, involve some unblurring 
of perception. In this context a few questions may be raised: 
_ The generating morphism cfr of free Boolean generation was shown to rigidly 
preserve the generating perception. Is this also true of the generating morphism tSk 
of free complete Boolean generation? 
_ In free Boolean generation there is a clear distinction between simple and complex 
connotations: the generating connotations are perceived with no need of computation, 
while derived, connotations are Boolean combinations of simple connotations and 
need computation to be perceived, This distinction may be lost with free complete 
b-perceptions. Simple connotations might get merged with complex ones. 
- How do these modifications to perceptions affect the computation of the free complete 
p-predicate? 
The answer to these questions is best illustrated by an example: 
Example 85. Let P = (1, e) be a perception, where ol, /3, y E 1 are connotations. Let 
(#?a~), and let (~~a,,,,3 A 1~). In particular, it is possible that, for some w E E, 
both Q(W, B) = Q(W, v) = u. In that case @(w, cr) is either for u, and hence also 
efr(w, a). However, by the definitions of Section 8, not only (B A -y E A), but also 
(a A -(/I A 1~) E A). It follows that, for all w E E, ecmn(w, #l A 1~) = f, as well as 
~~“P(war\-(DA-v))=f,andhenceitmustbethat~ cmp(~. a) = f. It is concluded that 
p-predicate values involving a simple connotation cy might have to be unblurred, cx might 
get merged with the bottom connotation 1. This should, of course, affect computation of 
the b-p-predicate for derived connotations that have cz as an atom. --XX is, of course, merged 
with the top connotation T and the unblurring is from u to t. 
For a more specific example, let P be the “bookstore catalog” perception of Example 2. 
Let 
(B = tmvelguide), (Y = maps), (a = no-map-travelguide). 
If travelguide subsumes maps, and no-map-travelguide subsumes (travelguide A-maps), 
then a complete b-perception with these subsumptions would not consider the possibility 
of a w-element with the connotation no-map-travelguide, even if the book is closed and 
hence its basic apparatus does not definitely rule out the option. 
One might say that by freely generating a complete b-perception, the agent internalizes 
the Boolean sketch subsumptions to a point where it affects its basic perception. 
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In Section 8.1 we compared complete b-perception to the situation of an analyst who 
internalizes all the experimental ab results (namely perceptual observations), leans back 
in his armchair, closes his eyes, and figures out ail the rest, eventually opening an eye to 
query the lab again. The unbluning of the generating perceptions by free complete Boolean 
generation may be compared to a situation where our analyst realizes that although its 
perception is undefined at a certain point, Q(W, ~1) = u, for all he knows, it must be that w 
should have (lack) (Y, or else “he has it all wrong” (by Section 2.4 his conjectures are based, 
after all, on partial perception and nonmonotonic logic). In scientific research terminology, 
if (ack, ecmp ) is a “theory”, then an experiment where the definite value of Q(W, w) is 
tested is one possible experiment for the verification of the theory. This is one of the cases 
where our analyst (i.e., the higher reasoning module) might want to query the lab (i.e., the 
sensory-motor-neural module) for improved perception. If he gets the unexpected value for 
p(w, a) he will open the other eye, too. 
These intuitive considerations can be neatly formalized by a closure of the sketch 
structured subcategory of perceptions. Definition 80 of that subcategory will now have 
another version with a closure condition (just like that of Definition 34 of b-perceptions): 
Definition 86. Prep, the closed sketch structured subcategory of perceptions, consists of 
_ perceptions P = (Z, Q) of Prc, such that, if V, Sk is the set of all sketch structured 
total improvements of P, then for all w E & and for all cx E Z, 
t ifGEVg, F(w,@)= t, 
@(wya)= f if%EVg, G(w,@)=f, 
I U otherwise; 
- sketch structured p-morphisms only. 
Remark 87. ‘P has to be unblurred for a certain pair (w, a) if, and only if, all sketch 
structured total improvements of P and hence all Qfrmonotone permits of Cfr, unblur the 
p-predicate at this point. In terms of Appendix A.3, this could happen if, and only if, either 
cx or YY are elements of Ao. It follows that such an unblurring depends only on u (and not 
on w). This could be meaningful for algorithmic implementations. 
For a known price in “open-mindedness” (some p-predicates have to be modified: the 
agent “closes its mind” to certain possibilities), the closed version PrcEk of the sketch 
structured subcategory Prczk settles that: 
- For all P E Prc?, the p-morphism tSk : P + @xmP(P) is rigid. 
- The computation of ecmp using truth tables similar to those of Section 6.4 still 
“bottoms-out” at the generating perception level. (Remark 87 should be useful for 
algorithmic implementations.) 
Free complete b-perceptions are indeed more complex than free Boolean perceptions. One 
may compute the free complete b-p-predicate Q cmp using truth tables similar to those 
of Section 6.4. Detection of Boolean dependencies’ in agk (the lower right entries of 
the disjunction and conjunction truth tables of Lemma 42) will be rewarded, as always, 
by more definite values. Only now there are more such dependencies (compared to free 
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Boolean generation), so that there is both more to look for, as well as more to be gained. 
This should not be surprising: as more efforts are being invested in the agent’s internal 
cognitive model, the agent should be expected to come up with more answers to more 
complex questions. 
As some distinctions between simple and complex connotations fade away, it may be 
that, for some generating connotation cx E Z, and for some non-atomic expression e E KBE, 
a and e are Qfr-synonyms, and hence they are merged in ( B:k, ecmp). In the case where 
a very complex connotation is merged with a simple one, later computational efforts 
could be reduced. Consider, for instance, a case where w is a pretzel, pretzelshape is a 
simple connotation, holistically recognized by the sensory-motor-neural apparatus, and 
B is a complex formal description of a pretzel shape. Q(W, pretzelshape) = t should be 
immediate. efr(w, @) necessitates computation, but ecmp(w, fi) is immediate because a 
complete b-perception means that the derived formal description of a pretzel shape has 
been internalized: #l = pretzetshape holds in the Boolean algebra of connotations i?gk. 
9.4. Summary of Section 9 
Free complete Boolean generation provides a rigorous mathematical description of a 
direct methodical cognitive transition from basic perceptions to a valid and complete inner 
image of the environment. In addition to the features of the more general free Boolean 
generation, an agent that performs this process may claim and show for fact that its 
own perceptual observations contribute enough interesting material on top of the general 
Boolean speculations, so that it can completely rely on the Boolean algebra of connotations 
for all it knows. The mathematical framework allows for a detailed comparison between 
the more general free Boolean generation and this generation. 
Artificial perceptions observe and, consequently, create an internal image of their 
environment. An agent with a free b-perception will never jump to a conclusion, on the 
other hand, its perception is very general. It is not going to feature neither mistakes, 
nor novel observations. It might be somewhat clumsy due to the huge size of its set of 
connotations. An agent with a free complete b-perception has invested lots of effort in its 
cognitive image of the environment and it is expected to come up with some interesting, 
novel observations. On the other hand, some of them may be “far-fetched”, because the 
agent jumped to conclusions. Such an agent may also feature some welcome “shortcuts” 
in its cognitive perception. 
10. Methodological fallout and some AI perspectives 
10.1. Intermediate Boolean generations and embodied perception 
The two canonical Boolean generations represent two extremes. A relation R, where 
<t,-rr c R c GPfi, could determine another Boolean sketch and ideal (I c AR c A, 
where a is as in Section 8.1). For free Boolean generation it is the case that R = &,_fr, 
and for free complete Boolean generation R = gpfr. In a typical case an agent’s perception 
is, probably, somewhere between a free b-perception and a free complete b-perception. In 
234 Z. Arzi-Gonczarowski, D. Lehmann /Art$cial intelligence 102 (1998) 187-247 
a typical situation the agent has computed and internalized only some of the subsumptions 
between its connotations. Boolean sketch subsumptions may get arbitrarily complex and 
hard to handle. For humans it may sometimes take a lifetime of intense contemplation and 
expertise to internalize all perceptually observed patterns, and their logical consequences, 
even in a restricted, specialized, professional environment E. Besides complexity, there 
may be other reasons for the preference of a specific, “intermediate” R. A subset of 
subsumptions (crag] may be, for instance, supported by more positive definite values of 
the p-predicate (i.e., more w in & such that ~(w, a) = t and also Q(W, B) = t). 
Out of the entire collection of intermediate Boolean generations, one merits special 
attention. Free monotone Boolean generation is defined for R = G&f,. U a. In that case 
the Boolean set of connotations is the free Boolean algebra that is generated over Z with 
the quasi order 9. (Alternatively: the free Boolean algebra that is generated over Z* 
with the partial order 2.) The set of permits for that b-perception consists exactly of the 
Boolean extensions of monotone total improvements of the generating perception, and this 
generation is free over the monotone subcategory l+cp. 
Free monotone generation merits special attention because of the special role that 
generating connotations play in perception. From the Boolean theoretic point of view there 
are many alternative subsets of connotations in the Boolean closure that could serve as 
generators. Some of them might even seem easier to work with then others. Assume, 
for example, a set of free generators for Bik, the sketch structured Boolean algebra of 
connotations. If one started from such a set of connotations as the generating set, then free 
generation would be the same as free complete generation. However, we let the agent start 
from “its own” set of generators 1, the set of simple connotations. This set is assumed 
to be perception specific, so that the categorical treatment must provide for an arbitrary 
set of generating connotations. This approach is based on the background assumption that 
perception is subjective and embodied. Generating connotations are assumed to be innate 
to the agent’s architecture, hard-wired in its sensory-motor-neural apparatus. They have 
an integrity of their own, serving as the most immediate and natural means of relating 
to its environment. Starting from the set of free generators to Btk, for example, would 
have meant that all the sketch subsumptions are innate to the agent’s own architecture and 
sensory-motor-neural apparatus. This is not always a reasonable assumption. Considering 
that different environments feature different patterns, this perception will not be able to 
adapt itself easily to some new environments. 
The analog in human perception are basic level categories (sometimes also called 
natural properties or natural kinds) extensively elaborated in [38]. They were isolated by 
empirical studies as a significant level of human interaction with the external environment. 
They are the easiest to learn, remember, and use. They are characterized, among other 
things, by fast identification, single mental images, shortest lexemes, and overall perceived 
shape (gestalt perception). It is at this level that humans easily distinguish tigers from 
elephants. (One level down things are more difficult. It is harder to distinguish one species 
of giraffe from another.) Analogous to the ease of cognitive processing of basic level human 
categories, simple connotations are assumed to be readily recognized by the sensory- 
motor-neural apparatus of an artificial agent, without further procedure. The single mental 
image and shortest lexemes ideas are analogous to the fact that a! is an atomic connotation 
expression. This gestalt perception is assumed to be embodied in the architecture of the 
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agent. Perception of derived connotations in the Boolean closure is achieved with due 
recourse to the deductive apparatus. This calls for an algorithmic treatment which might 
involve access and retrieval procedures: a resource consuming cognitive effort. 
It is reasonable to let the agent’s internal imagery be organized at the natural level of 
its generating connotations. This is why the categorical treatment assumes a perception 
specific set of connotational generators. There is nothing in generating connotations that 
gives them an objective status external to the agent. Reasoning and making inferences 
using Boolean perceptions may be figuratively described as moving along the sloping lines 
of the lattice graph. In that case the generating connotations are like glittering signposts that 
facilitate navigation. They are a form of representation of the embodiment of perception. 
In free monotone Boolean generation only subsumptions and synonyms between 
generating connotations are internalized. It should be expected that these are observed 
first, like an easy path between two familiar signposts. Boolean sketch subsumptions, on 
the other hand, necessitate complex Boolean connotational expressions. Ockham’s razor is 
also in favor of simpler patterns. 
Another support for the preference of subsumptions and synonyms between simple 
connotations also comes from arguments about inductive inference and the problem 
of projectibility, explained in 1251. Inferences between derived Boolean connotational 
expressions are not only harder to arrive at, they often seem far-fetched, counterintuitive, 
nonprojectible. 
10.2. Constraints and imagination in Boolean perception 
Subsumptions that are internalized by b-perceptions are actually constraints. Free 
Boolean generation features no constraints (except the obvious Boolean ones). Free 
complete Boolean generation could be regarded as the result of the cognitive internalization 
of constraints. The essence of generating the quotient Boolean algebra over an ideal is that 
the connotations of the ideal are “beamed down” to the bottom I of the quotient algebra, 
they are perceived as impossible, and hence negative constraints. Dually, the negations 
of these connotations, which constitute the respective dual filter, are “beamed up” to the 
top T, and perceived as positive constraints. 
The generation of complete b-perceptions, with its restriction of the set of possible total 
improvements, may have a conservative flavor, yet one can show that it is still capable of 
some imagination and abstraction. There may be connotations that do not have a definite 
positive example but they do not generate negative constraints. Dually, their negations 
do not have a definite negative example, yet they do not generate positive constraints. 
Figuratively, free complete Boolean generation can conceive a situation (formally: has a 
permit) where a w-element has (lacks) a connotation that has no current definite positive 
(negative) example. 
To show the above, one needs to find generating connotations a$ such that: 
- There exists some w’ E E where either ~(w’, a) = t and Q(w’, B) = u, or Q(w’, a) = 
u and ~(w’, p) = f. In that case the subsumption as/I does not hold, neither do 
Q~,,/I and (~g,,cmpp. However: 
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_ There exists no w E & such that Q(W, a) = t and Q(W, #I) = f. In that case it is 
possible for a! to subsume B in some future improvement of that perception, there 
is no counterexample. 
In that case: 
-e cmp(w’, a! A -B) = u, so that the connotation u A -/3 is not a negative constraint: 
0!r\-B#_L. 
_ For no w E & does the connotation a A -/3 hold. VW E & Q”(w, u A -/3) # t. 
Connotations like a! A-B above show that free complete Boolean generation is still capable 
of imagination. Such connotations have no definite positive example, yet they do not 
generate negative constraints. Dually, their negations are connotations with no definite 
negative example, yet they do not generate positive constraints. 
Example 88. In our bookstore environment, let (CY = children) and (fi = bigprint), then 
no w-element is definitely both children and -bigprint, but such a book is conceivable. 
In Section 5.2 a similarity was shown between Lukasiewicz’s three-valued conditionals 
and our definition of subsumptions (and synonyms): crag if and only if for all w E E 
Q(W, a) + Q(W, p) is t by Lukasiewicz’s three-valued conditional. One case, t -+ f, 
where this does not hold yields an f value, while the other two cases (t --+ i and i -+ f) 
yield an indefinite value (i). It turns out that this is exactly the distinction that was 
made above. The second case that yields an f value was eliminated while the cases that 
yield an indefinite value were the ones that demonstrate imagination. These are, actually, 
examples of (con)notations without denotations, showing that free complete generation 
leaves room for abstraction: an inner representation that goes beyond things which are 
actually perceived. The distinction between conceivable and inconceivable is the existence 
of a suitable permit. Of course, if a perception is totally two-valued, then it is its one and 
only permit: total perceptions leave no room for imagination. 
10.3. Perception morphisms revisited 
Perceptions vary across agents, modules, time, situations, goals, interests, etc. The main 
tool of comparison and transition between them are p-morphisms. P-morphisms provide a 
versatile tool that is able to capture a variety of cognitive processes: 
_ Perhaps the most obvious use of a p-morphism is to “translate” between different 
perceptions of the same environment &, as shown in our “bookstore” examples. In 
this case the nature of the mapping (set-isomorphism, one-to-one, onto, Boolean, 
impossible etc.) carries meticulous information about how close these perceptions 
are. The extent of the modification that is introduced by a p-morphism is proportional 
to the extent of the change that has caused it. In an AI environment these p-morphisms 
could be used to: 
l Communicate and compare between distinct agents. 
l Communicate and compare between different modules of the same agent. Different 
modules may use different representations for their different purposes. If the 
reasoning module, for instance, was planned independently of the sensory-motor- 
neural module, it may well be that the former assumes a perception that is different 
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from the agent’s own generation. A suitable p-morphism would have to be used 
to bridge between them. The nature of the mapping, if at all possible, carries 
meticulous information about how well they fit. 
l The essence of some learning, discovery and other creative cognitive processes 
is in finding the most suitable representation (i.e., set of connotations) for a 
given environment and goals. The shift in perception, if possible, should be best 
formalized by a p-morphism. 
- The current study was mostly dedicated to the construction of p-morphisms that 
capture high-level representation formation: starting from a basic perception, organize 
and shape a structured representation that can be further used for high-level cognitive 
processes. The study further provided tools to determine where and when certain 
constructions might cost a communication. 
- A lifelong autonomous agent is naturally expected to constantly improve its 
perception and learn more about its environment. This improving change of 
perception within the same set of connotations is also easily captured by the family of 
“improving” p-morphisms. 
- One of the aspects of cognitive behavior is the ability to preserve an individual 
perception within a society of other perceptions. In Example 17 it was shown how 
categorical notions provide us with convenient tools of scrutiny to formalize several 
forms of joint perceptions. 
10.4. Learning and knowledge acquisition 
The prime idea in the category of perceptions is that the agent could organize its 
internal representation relying only on its perception. There might be cases, however, 
where “outside advice” could save time or other computational resources. The question 
is exactly how and where such outside advice could be used in our context. For a given 
perception P = (I, Q) there are two families of “facts”: 
- Prima~facts. These are essentially the values of the p-predicate for all w-elements 
and generating connotations. 
- Derivedfacts, which consist of material that is derived from the primary facts: 
l Synonyms, subsumptions, and Boolean sketch structure. These can be attained by 
forms of inductive learning. 
l Values of the p-predicate for derived connotations, which may be computed from 
the primary p-predicate using the deductive apparatus from Section 6.4. 
Technically speaking, any subset of facts could be directly entered into the agent’s memory. 
The insertion of derivedfacts typically saves the time of the agent’s own processes. The 
agent could, theoretically at least, reach that fact all by itself. This kind of “learning by 
being told” has as human analog one’s communication with the heritage of its culture, its 
community’s accumulative knowledge. Nobody after Newton is expected to rediscover the 
law of gravity all by himself, one is simply being taught about it. One thus starts with all 
available knowledge explicitly at hand, and can use its resources to acquire some genuine 
new knowledge. Once a fact is internalized, there is no obvious way of telling how it got 
there. There seem to be no methodological problem with the agent acquiring any subset of 
these facts “by being told’. However, there is the usual word of warning: in view of the sub- 
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jectivity of perceptions, entering any fact concerning w-elements and connotations presup- 
poses that the interpretation of these entities is shared by the “learner” and the “teacher”. If 
this is not the case, an appropriate p-morphism should be used. In [ 191 it is explained how 
communication is the exchange of representations, while meanings are created within the 
individual. Even with a p-morphism, one has to trust that the two sides share meanings. 
The direct insertion of primary facts is more problematic. “Telling” an agent the value 
of ,Q(w, o) is bypassing perception. As opposed to the insertion of a derived fact, one 
could not always claim that the agent could, not even theoretically, reach that fact all by 
itself. If the agent has the definite perception of the fact Q(W, a), then it does not need “to 
be told” about it. If the agent’s perception has Q(W, cr) = u, it could perhaps sometimes 
be claimed that the insertion of a definite value saves efforts from the agent’s sensory- 
motor-neural apparatus: the agent could, for example, have checked inside the book for the 
edition number, but to save efforts this information could be inserted. Not all u values of 
the p-predicate, however, are of this nature. 
If a perception does not include either w or cr, then Q(W, CY) does not mean much. Fak- 
ing “perception” this way brings us into Searle’s Chinese room [54]. The facts could be 
entered into memory and retrieved at any time, but they are not grounded by perception in 
the environment. 
11. Conclusion 
It is generally accepted that true understanding can only be gained by actually 
experiencing the world and thereby developing an internal representation of it. Parallel 
to experiencing its environment, an intelligent artificial perception should also need to 
“contemplate” about its experience. It would thus infer and internalize facts that are needed 
for a valid (and possibly complete) internal representation. 
Almost forty years ago, Bar-Hillel was the first to point out the world modeling process 
that should go on in the mind of agents. In his case it was supposed to guide understanding 
of natural language. Bar-Hillel wrote: 
A translation machine should not only be supplied with a dictionary but also with 
a universal encyclopedia. This is surely utterly chimerical and hardly deserves any 
further discussion . . . . We know . . . facts by inferences which we are able to 
perform . . . instantaneously, and it is clear that they are not, in any serious sense, 
stored in our memory. Though one could envisage that a machine would be capable 
of performing the same inferences, there exists so far no serious proposal for a 
scheme that would make a machine perform such inferences in the same or similar 
circumstances under which an intelligent human being would perform them. [5, 
pp. 160-1613 
The theory of artificial perceptions suggests that, theoretically, such encyclopaedias could 
perhaps be schemed and organized, individually for every perception and environment, 
as Boolean perceptions generated over basic sensory-motor-neural perceptions. Boolean 
algebras are, in a certain sense, bimodal: they have the (somewhat tedious) aspect of 
symbolic processing using the Boolean connectives, and, on the other hand, the non- 
symbolic iconographic aspect of their lattice graphs with sloping lines (offering eventual 
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shortcuts like “ladders and ropes”). Facts and inferences could be internalized by the lattice 
structures themselves, rather than conventionally stored in memories. Perceptive-cognitive 
and reasoning processes would then perform by sliding along gratings of Boolean trellises. 
Environments should train upon these trellises with tendrils provided by the generating 
perceptions and clinging at the nodes of simple connotations. 
The theory of artificial perceptions also provides general, categorical, tools for creating 
particular encyclopaedias, as well as foundations for a general account of these structures 
and of relationships between them. 
12. Future research 
This is a theoretical study that proposes a foundational mathematical “unified standard’ 
for Al artifacts with perceptions, for their cognitive behavior, and for dealing with them. 
Within the theoretical framework the ongoing study is concerned with the study of 
cognitive processes that involve more then a single environment at a time. 
Although a few implementational considerations were touched in the context of the 
computation of Boolean perception predicates, the theory still calls for more research on 
complexity and implementational issues. 
The categorical approach is inherently “top-down”. Given the theory, future research 
could now take a “bottom-up” approach. One may test the practical applicability of the 
theory by: 
- designing architectures for AI artifacts in terms of the proposed theory; 
_ analyzing existing artifacts in terms of the proposed theory. 
One may start with the construction or analysis of basic artificial perceptions with simple 
environments: w-elements, connotations, and the perception predicate. One may proceed to 
design uniform ducts between these perceptions using perception morphisms, then further 
categorical and Boolean constructs that capture the various cognitive processes, training 
on these basic perceptions. 
Applying the terminology of this study to the environment of AI research itself, future 
research concerning particular perceptive-cognitive AI artifacts is invited to conceive, 
design, and analyze its own w-elements (namely these artifacts) with connotations that are 
the primitives of this theory of artificial perceptions: w-element, connotation, perception 
predicate, the categorical primitives (morphism, domain, codomain, composition) and the 
Boolean primitives. This relatively small number of primitives predicts the possibility of 
tidily structured implementations with a reduced component set, where components are 
reusable across a broad spectrum of cognitive activity. 
Appendix A. Technicalities are a necessary evil 
A rigorous mathematical theory warrants tidiness and neat formulations. The price is, 
sometimes, a tedious proof of various technicalities. Once they are taken care of, one 
could usually forget about them (one has, however, gained insights into the structure). 
The material in this appendix would have interfered with the flow of the presentation, so it 
was gathered here. No new premises or concepts are introduced in this appendix. 
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A. 1. Technicalitiesfor Boolean perceptions 
For Section 6, the following considerations are needed: 
_ Given a perception (D, a) every w E E naturally defines a three-valued mapping: 
0, . B -+ (t, f, u) : B ++ o (w, /3). For the current purpose it is convenient to regard 
o;, as a partial two-valued mapping, such that ~~ is undefined for ,6 if and only if 
a(w, B) = u. Whenever the perception (I?, cr) is total, then, for all w E E, ow is a 
total two-valued mapping. 
- { t. f) could be regarded as the two-element Boolean algebra which consists of a “top” 
t and a “bottom” f only. In that case, a total a, : B + (t, f ) is either a two-valued 
Boolean homomorphism or it is not. (A predicate defined on a Boolean algebra is 
traditionally expected to be such a two-valued homomorphism.) Similarly, a partial 
0, . . B -+ (t, f } could either be extended to a two-valued Boolean homomorphism, 
or it could not. 
A few known Boolean algebraic results are needed as well. The first one (see, for example, 
[55]) is due to a natural bijective correspondence between maximal ideals, maximal filters, 
and two-valued homomorphisms. 
A mapping h : f? + (t, f } is a two-valued homomorphism if and only if the set 
V = (/I E a(l/~(B) = t) is a maximal filter, and the set n = {/3 E allh(/I) = f} is 
then the dual maximal ideal. 
Extensions to two-valued homomorphisms, together with the implied partition into a 
maximal ideal and its dual maximal filter, are going to serve as an alternative touchstone 
for b-perceptions. Based on the definitions of a, above, and of 17, the natural morphism of 
Example 12, it is easy to show that: 
Lemma A.1. Let C = (t?, a) he a total perception where B is a Boolean algebra. Then the 
natural p-morphism (of Example 12) 
n:c+U&:BH (wE&~~a(w,~)=t) 
is Boolean tj’and only $ for every w E E, oW : 13 + ( t , f } is a two-valued homomorphism. 
Since a permit defines a total perception which answers the conditions of Lemma A. 1, 
then, using it and the known Boolean results that were quoted before one gets: 
Corollary A.2. The following three conditions are equivalent: 
(i) C = (a, a) is a b-perception. 
(ii) For every w E & the two-valued partial mapping cr, could be extended to a two- 
valued homomorphism. 
(iii) For every w E E, t3 can be divided into a maximalJilter VW and a dual maximal 
ideal A, such that, jar all B in 13, n(w, ,B) = t =R B E V, and (T(w, ,B) = ,f j 
/3 E A,. In that case a permit L? oj’C is dejined, for all w E & and for all B E B, in 
thefollowing way: $B E 8, then z(w, t3) = t and if/3 E A, then ;i(w, B) = f. 
We shall designate by A$ the maximal ideal associated with w and the permit z, and its 
dual maximal filter by V%. 
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In a certain sense, Corollary A.2 is the point where the present study meets the classical 
theory that admits only total descriptions and two truth values. Loosely: b-perceptions 
are neither total nor two-valued, but they have the potential of evolving into two-valued 
perceptions. 
The necessary and sufficient Boolean characterization of Corollary A.2 provides us with 
further tools to understand b-p-predicates. Consider C = (B, a), and the set V of all its 
permits. For all w E E consider the following intersections: 
As an intersection of maximal filters, V, is a proper filter. Similarly, A, is a proper ideal 
since it is an intersection of maximal ideals. Moreover, they are dual one to the other. 
Furthermore, by the last item of Corollary A.2 and by the second condition of Definition 34, 
one gets: 
Lemma A.3. For all w in E: 
V, = {/9 E Bllc~(w, ,5) = t} and A, = (B E f?l/a(w, j?) = f]. 
Definition 34 provided an external, categorical, definition of b-perceptions. Lemma A.3 
enables us to formulate a necessary and sufficient condition for the recognition of 
b-perceptions “from inside”: 
We now prove: 
Lemma 41. A perception C = (t3, a) such that the set I3 of connotations is a Boolean 
algebra is a b-perception if and only iffor all w E I: 
(i) The set (/I E Blla(w, B) = t) is ajlter: 
(ii) The set (/I E Bllo(w, p) = f} is an ideal. 
(iii) The above$lter and ideal are dual one to the other: for all ,B in t?, a(w, @) = t ij 
and only if a(w, -/3) = f. 
Proof. The condition is necessary by Lemma A.3. It is sufficient by the following Boolean 
results which are part of Stone’s fundamental representation theorem of [Xl: 
l For every proper ideal A (proper filter V) there exists a maximal ideal (maximal filter) 
containing A (containing V). 
l For every proper ideal A (proper filter V) there exists a two-valued homomorphism 
h such that h(p) = f for all jl E A (h(j3) = t for all /I E 0). •I 
Algorithm 1. One may generate a permit for a given b-perception, using a method that is 
based on the general Boolean algebraic construction of the maximal ideal (filter) which is 
used for a proof of Stone’s representation theorem (see, for example, [Xl). The essence of 
that construction is that, for every w E E, and every ordering {/li)i=t ,n on the connotations, 
one builds an increasing sequence { Ai)i=u,, of proper ideals, where Au = A,,, and A, is 
a maximal ideal containing A,. Every ideal Ai represents a Boolean improvement pi of 
U, where, for all /3 E Ai, O~(W, /I) = f and ai(w, -#%) = t, otherwise ai(w, /I) = u. nn is 
thus a permit of C = (I3, a). Proof is by induction as for the cited construction. 
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We now prove: 
Lemma 42. The truth tables for the b-p-predicate o are given by Tables l-3. 
Proof outline. Lemma 41 provides proofs to all cases where one is able to come up with 
a definite (t or f) value for cr. To prove the remaining cases, where the value of (J should 
be u, one needs to go back to the original Definition 34. An example is the following proof 
that if o(w, o) = a(w, /I) = u, then a(w, (Y v /?) = u (unless -a&9, in which case it is t): 
Since A, is an ideal, it cannot be that a(w, o) = a(w, /3) = u and a(w, o v p) = f. 
The value of ~(w, cx v /3) is thus either t or u. We show that it is t if and only if 
-a<B. The “if” part holds since, in that case, a! v fi = T (see Corollary 36). To show 
the “only if” part, let a(w, TV) = B(W, B) = u, and assume negatively that a(w, o v 
,!I) = t. Since o is a b-p-predicate it follows that for all permits ;i(w, (Y v 6) = t. 
Recall the maximal ideal A% and the maximal filter \7: of Corollary A.2. By their 
maximality, whenever #I is an element of A:, then a! must be an element of Oz, and 
hence la! must be an element of AZ. This necessarily implies (by AZ being an ideal) 
that -w&9. 
Argumentations of a similar nature can be used to prove that: 
_ Let a(w, cr) = a(w, /3) = u, then a(w, o A B) = u (unless cr<lj3, in which case it 
is f). 
- Let a(w, a) = f and a(w, /I) = u, then a(w, o v ,5) = u. 
_ Let a(w, a) = t and a(w, /l) = u, then a(w, a! A B) = u. q 
A.2. Technicalities for free generation of Boolean perceptions 
For Section 7 we provide the proof of Lemma 47 that free Boolean generation preserves 
morphisms: 
Lemma 47. Let P = (Z, Q) and & = (3, t), and let f : P -+ Q be a p-morphism. Let 
Gfr(P) = (a$, ef’), and Gfr(Q) = (L?$, tfr). Let h : l3: -+ L?s be the unique extension of 
the mapping 
T+Bfj:Olt+ f(a) 
into a Boolean homomorphism such that Va E Z h(o) = ,f (a). Then the mapping 
Gf’(f) : GfYP) + GfYQ), 
dejned by: /3 H h(B), is a b-p-morphism such that the diagram of Fig. 2 is commutative. 
Proof. For the proof we shall consider the “inverse pyramid’ diagram of Fig. A. 1. The 
diagram of Fig. 2 is its “top cover”. It is first observed, using no-blur of f, that any total 
improvement 3 of & implies a total improvement c of P: Vex E Z c(w, a) = Y(w, f(a)). 
These total improvements can be uniquely extended, respectively, into a permit 9’ of 
Gfr( Q) and a permit pibl of Gfr(‘P) (Lemma 43). Moreover, since these permits agree on the 
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Fig. A. 1. “Inverse pyramid” diagram. 
set of generators Z, then also, for all B in 8, pt(w, /3) = pt(w, h(p)). It follows that the 
permits of $7”( Q) define a subset of the permits of Gfr(P). Assume now that efr(w, p) # u. 
By definition of Q fr, for any permit e *’ of Gfr(P), p;O’(w, /3) = efr(w, /?) # u. This holds, 
in particular, for the permits that are defined, as above, by the permits of Gfr (Q). It follows 
that for any permit ?“, p’(w, h(B)) = efr(w, ,9) # u, and this holds for rfr as well: 
tfr(w, h(B)) = efr(w, j3) # u, so that G’(f) is no-blur and hence a unique, b-p-morphism. 
It is hence easy to see that the “inverse pyramid’ diagram of Fig. A. 1 is commutative. 0 
A.3. Technicalities for completion of Boolean perceptions 
The rest of this technical appendix is needed for Section 8.1. Definition 62 of the 
completed perception is quite straightforward, but it has to be technically justified. We 
first establish that B is a not a degenerate Boolean algebra: 
Lemma A.4 A is a proper ideal, A # B. 
Proof. We are going to show that A = I? implies that one of the elements of S is generated 
by an “illegal” a-subsumption. First observe that: 
- If A = B, then VsEs s = T. 
- By definition of S and of 5 it follows that, for all s E S and for all w E E, o (w, s) # t . 
It follows from the truth table for disjunction in b-perceptions (Table 2) that there is some 
Boolean dependence in the set S: there is a subset X C S, of at least two elements, 
suchthat,althoughforallitssubsetsY~XVwEEa(w,V,,~s)#t,V~~~s=T.Let 
X = Y U {s’}. If VsEys v s’ = T, then, - V,Eys<s’, and -s’< VsGys. By validity of 
C the above Boolean subsumptions imply the corresponding a-subsumptions, and thus 
VW E & a(w, s’) = u. By definition of S, s’ = u A -j3 for some as,!?, so, for all w E E, 
a(w a) = a(w, /3) = u. This is a contradiction to Definition 53. q 
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Corollary A.5. For all w E f, CJ (w, VSEs s) # t 
We verify now that < cmp could be a b-p-morphism onto C. 
Proposition A.6 Let C = (B, cr) be a b-perception. Whenever a! Z B, then it cannot be 
that one of o (w, a), o (w, /I) is t and the other one is f. 
Proof. It follows by Corollary A.5 and validity of C that, for all w E E and for all 
connotations j!? E A, cr(w, /3) # t. If, for some w E &, one of a(w, a), a(w, /I) is t and 
the other one is f, then either B(W, a! A-B) = t, or a(w, B A -a) = t, so that a 7 B. q 
It remains to establish that C is a b-perception. It is first shown that a permit of C, 
if it exists, is monotone (as one should expect by Proposition 59). Existence is shown 
afterwards. 
Proposition A.7. Let r be a permit of c, then u a-subsumption, asp, implies a T 
subsumption, [a]$[B]. 
Proof. By construction of a a a-subsumption, crs/3, implies a Boolean subsumption, 
[a]<[B]. A permit r defines a total b-p-predicate, and, by validity, the Boolean 
subsumption implies the perceptual r subsumption [cz] 5 [/?I. q 
T, if it exists, induces a monotone permit, t’ = tcrnn o t of C. We are going to show that 
all the monotone permits of C are so induced. As always in this category of perceptions, 
the universal perception, U&, is the primary tool for bootstrapping technicalities. 
Proposition A-8. Let $ be a monotone permit of C, then (Y 2 B implies that a! and p are 
Z-synonyms. 
Proof. As a monotone permit, $ defines a monotone b-p-morphism into the universal 
perception which is complete (by Example 55). It follows that connotations in A 
are mapped to the bottom of U& (namely to the ld connotation), and the proposition 
follows. 0 
Let $ be a monotone permit of C. By the last proposition Z? is also a permit of C, and 
hence: 
Corollary A.9. I” C has a monotone permit, then so does c. 
We need to show that every b-perception has a monotone permit. A construction of a 
general permit for a b-perception was described in Algorithm 1 of Appendix A. 1. It can be 
easily modified to produce monotone permits. 
Algorithm 2. This is similar to Algorithm I, except that one starts from an ideal A0 which 
is generated by both A, and A. 
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Lemma A.lO. All the ideals (Ai)i=o., of Algorithm 2 are proper and the corresponding 
p-predicates ai are monotone Boolean improvements of cr. 
Proof outline. First show that A0 is proper. A, is proper because C is a b-perception and 
A is proper by Lemma A.4. It remains to show that, for all B E A, -fi $ A,. Let fl E A, 
then fi 2 1. By Proposition A.6, for all w E 8, a(w, B) # t, and hence a(w, -/S) # f. It 
follows that -p $ A,. This completes the proof that A0 is proper. 
We show now that a0 is a monotone Boolean improvement of m: it is an improvement 
since, by Proposition A.6, for all w E 8, O(W, /?) # t. It is Boolean because A0 is proper. 
Lastly, to show that it is monotone, let a!GB, so that cr A -B E S c A c Ao. It follows that 
OO(W, (Y A -B) = f, and in that case 
oo(w, w) 2 ao(w, B). 
The general induction step is similar to Algorithm 1. •I 
Corollary A.ll. c has a (monotone) permit. 
It remains to show the closure condition of Definition 34 for c: 
Proposition A.12. Let C(w, [p]) = u. Then there exists some monotone permit, gl, of C, 
where $1 (w [p]) = f, and anotherpermit, L?z, where gz(w [/?I) = t. 
Proof outline. Assume negatively that, for all monotone permits ;i, ??(w, #?) = f(t), and 
hence fi E A0 (-b E Ao). It can neither be that B E A, (-B E A,), nor that /3 E A 
(-/I E A). We then use the closure property of C and the definition of a to contradict the 
remaining possibility that, for some y E A, and some 6 E A, /I = y q 
Corollary A.13. c is a b-perception, and the set of its permits consists of all the monotone 
permits of C. 
Finally we can prove: 
Lemma 63. A completed perception is a complete b-perception. 
Proof. [a]a[B] is a i;j subsumption if, and only if, for all monotone permits Z of C, 
crag. This holds if and only if crap is a a-subsumption. In that case, by definition of 
8 blW1. 0 
Corollary A.14. 
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